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#### Topical affirmatives must instrumentally defend an expansion of the scope of the United States’ core antitrust laws to substantially increase prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices.

#### Resolved means a policy

Louisiana House 5

(http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm)

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### Federal government is the legislative, executive and judicial

US Legal No Date (United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/)

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### Should requires action

AHD 2k

(American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com))

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### The “core” antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and FTC Act

Lisa Kimmel 20, Senior Counsel at Crowell & Moring, LLP in Washington, D.C., twenty years of experience as an antitrust lawyer and holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California at Berkeley; and Eric Fanchiang, associate in Crowell & Moring’s Irvine, CA office and a member of the firm’s antitrust and commercial litigation groups, 2020, “Antitrust and Intellectual Property Licensing,” in 2020 Licensing Update, Wolters Kluwer Legal & Regulatory U.S., https://www.crowell.com/files/20200401-Licensing-Update-Chapter-13.pdf

U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### The scope of those antitrust laws is bound by governmental exemptions and immunities

Kruse et al. 19, Layne E. Kruse, Co-Chair; Melissa H. Maxman, Co-Chair; Vittorio Cottafavi, Vice Chair; Stephen M. Medlock, Vice Chair; David Shaw, Vice Chair; Travis Wheeler, Vice Chair; Lisa Peterson, Young Lawyer Representative; all on the Exemptions and Immunities Committee of the ABA Antitrust Section, “Long Range Plan, 2018-19,” American Bar Association, 3/18/19, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust\_law/lrps/2019/exemptions-immunities.pdf

D. Top 3 Accomplishments Since Last Long Range Plan in 2015

(1) Publications. In addition to our Annual ALD Updates, we are set to publish an update to the Noerr-Pennington Handbook, which should be out in 2019. We also published a new version of the State Action Handbook in 2016. The Handbook on the Scope of the Antitrust Laws was published in 2015.

(2) Commentary on Legislative and Regulatory Proposals. The Committee has been very active in supporting Section commentary on proposed legislation, regulations, and other policy issues.

For instance, in March 2018, the E&I Committee assisted former E&I Chair John Roberti in composing his article, “The Role and Relevance of Exemptions and Immunities in U.S. Antitrust Law”, presented to the DOJ Antitrust Division Roundtable on behalf of the ABA Antitrust Section.

In January 2018, in response to a request from the Section Chair, we submitted Section comments along with the Legislative and State AG Committees, addressing the proposed Restoring Board Immunity Act legislation that would impact the post-NC Dental exemptions and immunity climate. Previously, we commented on the Professional Responsibility Act.

(3) Spring Meeting Programs. We have sponsored or co-sponsored a program at every Spring Meeting since our last long range plan. In 2019 we will chair Sham Litigation after FTC v. AbbVie The FTC v. AbbVie decision – calling for the disgorgement of $448 million on the basis of sham patent litigation. In addition, we will co-sponsor in 2019 with the Trade, Sports & Professional Associations Committee, a program on “Antitrust Law's Anomalous Treatment of Sports,” addressing how US courts have shown broad deference to the "rules of the game," including near-immunity status for concepts such as "amateurism."

II. Major Competition/Consumer Protection Policy or Substantive Issues Within Committee’s Jurisdiction Anticipated to Arise Over Next Three Years

A. Issue #1: Will Certain Exemptions Be Eliminated or Expanded?

A goal of the current DOJ Antitrust Division is to streamline antitrust laws, and in particular, take a hard look at exemptions and immunities. This is in the wheelhouse of our Committee’s fundamental policy issue: How much of the economy has opted out of our antitrust system? Is that a problem or are ad hoc exemptions acceptable ways to fine tune the application of the antitrust laws?

We anticipate, therefore, that efforts to enact or to repeal existing statutory exemptions and immunities will continue. In recent years, there have been efforts to repeal the exemptions for railroads and (at least in part) the McCarran-Ferguson insurance exemption. The Section and the Committee has generally supported efforts to repeal statutory exemptions. Given that repeal issues are very political it is unlikely that we will see many exemptions actually repealed.

On the other hand, proposals for new exemptions and immunities will continue to be introduced in Congress. The Committee will improve on a template for use in assisting the Section in drafting comments to Congress on newly proposed exemptions and immunities.

One development that may continue in the health care area are issues over a "COPA" or "Certificate of Public Advantage" at the state level. A COPA is a state statutory mechanism that provides certain collaborations in the health care community with immunity from private or government actions under the antitrust laws by invoking the state action doctrine. The FTC has generally opposed such efforts at the state level, but several states have used them to immunize health care mergers. This is a major development that should be monitored.

Through programs, newsletters, and Connect entries, the Committee intends to educate its members about Congressional and other efforts to repeal, or introduce new, exemptions and immunities, as well as the application of existing statutory exemptions and immunities in the courts. The Committee’s Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust Law, published in 2015, addresses developments in the statutory immunities area. It built on the prior publication, Federal Statutory Exemptions from Antitrust Law Handbook in 2007. Our Scope book will need to be updated within the next three years.

B. Issue #2: Will There Be Legislative Solutions to State Action Issues at State and Federal Levels?

The FTC’s case against the North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners put the "active supervision" prong of the state action test front and center. North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 135 S.Ct. 1101 (2015). The Court agreed with the FTC’s position that state occupational licensing boards comprised of market participants must satisfy the active supervision requirement. This spurred additional suits against other types of state boards involving regulated professionals. Moreover, every State had to reassess its boards to determine if there is "active supervision." Courts and state legislatures are addressing those issues. We also expect the proper framing of the clear articulation prong of the state action doctrine will be addressed. The Supreme Court spoke to the clear articulation test in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013), narrowing the foreseeability test to cover only situations in which the anticompetitive conduct is the “inherent, logical, or ordinary result of the exercise of authority delegated by the state legislature.” How this test has played out in the lower courts will be of particular interest to the Committee and its membership. The COPA issues, at the state level, as previously mentioned, will impact this area.

The Committee expects to address these issues through updates to Connect, newsletters, Spring Meeting programs, committee programs, its contributions to the Annual Review of Antitrust Law Developments. The State Action Practice Manual addresses these issues, as well as the Committee’s Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust Law.

C. Issue #3: Will Noerr Be Restricted or Expanded?

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine is an exemption issue that is frequently litigated. In particular, the most likely area of further development is in the pharma industry. Alleged misrepresentations to government agencies has caught the attention of some courts. In addition, there may be more development on the pattern exception, which raises the issue of whether each act of petitioning in a pattern must satisfy the objectively and subjectively baseless requirements for sham petitioning. The Committee’s new Handbook on Noerr (forthcoming) and its earlier Handbook on the Scope of Antitrust Law addresses developments in the Noerr law.

III. Specific Long Term Plans to Strengthen Committee

The Committee provides important services to the membership of the Section through publications, drafting ABA Antitrust Section comments to proposed regulation and international competition proposed immunities, and programming. The goals of the Committee include: (1) to provide policy comments on key questions about the scope of the antitrust laws for legislation and policy-making; (2) produce a mix of publications and programming that provides relevant and useful information to our members; (3) to ensure that the Committee remains valuable to our members’ practices; and (4) to make the most productive use of electronic communications to deliver the Committee’s work product.

A. Potential Modifications to Charter: What is the Role of this Committee?

The Committee’s current charter accurately characterizes its purview—that is, addressing the scope of the antitrust laws. That scope, of course, is defined primarily in terms of exemptions and immunities (both statutory and non-statutory). The Committee, however, has dealt with other doctrines, such as preemption and primary jurisdiction. These areas may not necessarily be viewed as traditional exemptions or immunities, but they nonetheless directly affect the application and extent of the antitrust laws. In addition, the Committee expends significant efforts to address international issues, including statutory exclusions from the U.S. antitrust laws, including the FTAIA; the related doctrines of act of state, sovereign immunity, and foreign sovereign compulsion; and industry-specific exemptions and exclusions from non-U.S. antitrust laws, including blocking exemptions.

#### They violate because each of the above words require governmental action

#### Vote negative — 3 impacts —

#### 1 — Fairness — forced winner-loser nature means debate is a game — the aff has a strategic incentive to stray from the resolution — that makes research impossible, discourages argumentative innovation, and turns accessibility — accesses the terminal impact to the activity.

#### 2 — Clash — they incentivise defense of unanswerable positions and monopolization of moral high ground — denies a role for the neg and transforms debate into a lecture — that destroys rigorous testing, advocacy, and research skills — turns their advocacy and precludes every intrinsic benefit to debate.

#### 3 — Topic Education — policy debates over antitrust are valuable

Waller & Morse 20, \*John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law; Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola University Chicago School of Law \*\*J.D. Expected 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (\*Spencer Weber Waller \*\*Jacob Morse, 7-26-2020, "The Political Face of Antitrust," Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial, and Commercial Law, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3660946)

IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139

Conclusion

Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

#### Switch side debate solves their offense — it’s the greatest internal link to advocacy skills and the most reflexive version of the topic.

### 1NC — K

#### The aff prevents class struggle by guiding political strategies towards ivory-tower pessimism

Kipcak 20, leading activist of Der Funke, the Austrian section of the IMT (Yola Kipcak, 12-2-2020, "Marxism vs Queer Theory," Socialist Revolution, https://socialistrevolution.org/marxism-vs-queer-theory/)

Resistance is futile!

If we remain in the natural habitat of Queer Theory, the world of academic papers, this debate seems like an intellectual thrill in which one passes philosophical quotes back and forth. However, as we wrote at the beginning, philosophical premises also lead to certain practical conclusions. The omnipresence of power in Queer Theory means that we can never escape from it, that every resistance is only an expression of power itself and ultimately serves stability. Hence, Foucault’s relatively well-known quote that resistance “is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power,” and that therefore there are only “possible, necessary, improbable, spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent … quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial” resistances. (History of Sexuality: 95–6.) Recent insights and practices surrounding “queer,” question the belief in the possibility of long-term social change or emancipation in general. (Jagose, 61) This absolute pessimism toward social movements, the belief that any resistance is automatically doomed, shows how little these philosophers understood of the revolutionary movements of the 1960s and 1970s and the reasons for their failure. They reflect the hopelessness of the feminist deadlock, of the petty bourgeoisie that doesn’t trust the working class (if they even believe it exists). Instead of understanding and criticizing the role of the mass organizations’ leadership, they look for new ways of “resistance” without a clear idea against who or what this resistance should be directed, and what methods should be used. The possibility of an overthrow of the ruling system appears unfeasible and impossible. As a consequence, Queer Theory suggests a practice that makes even the mildest reformism look radical. It retreats completely into the field of culture and language. There should be new “terms” for identity, a “new grammar” developed or a “new ethic” drawn up (Gayle Rubins). For instance, in order to “expose” the illusion of sexes, Butler suggests parodying gender identities through “cultural practices of drag, crossdressing and the sexual stylization of butch/femme identities” (GT, 137). This is the only practical suggestion in the whole book Gender Trouble! And Nancy Fraser, relieved, explains: The good news is that we do not need to overthrow capitalism in order to remedy [the economic disadvantage of gays]—although we may well need to overthrow it for other reasons. The bad news is that we need to transform the existing status order and restructure the relations of recognition. (285) Read: we need to improve the image of homosexuality. Here, Fraser, who is comparatively more practically inclined, openly displays her reformism: luckily she doesn’t have to overthrow capitalism! She only has to change how society views homosexuality! It is no wonder that Queer Theory has been willingly taken up by some reformists within the workers’ organizations in order to evade the responsibility of leading an actual struggle against discrimination with strikes, mass protests, in short, methods of class struggle, and instead focus on demands for language reforms, quotas, cultural free spaces and rainbow-colored crosswalks. By omitting the class question, Queer Theory is not only a useful tool in the hands of bureaucrats within the workers’ organizations, it also serves as an ideological justification for a section of the bourgeoisie and capitalist forces to present themselves as LGBT friendly and paint a liberal and progressive image of themselves. Corporations such as Apple or Coca Cola, who exploit tens of thousands of people in terrible working conditions, support LGBT campaigns in their companies or finance party trucks handing out free alcohol at commercialized Pride parades. In order to finance the production of seemingly radical, but actually (for the ruling class) completely harmless ideas, thousands of Euros are spent on gender studies professorships, departments and queer study scholarships, while the left-liberal media and publishers print benevolent articles and novels. Many queer activists are aware of these tendencies and are clearly against the coopting of their resistance by the ruling system. However, Queer Theory does not offer the ideas necessary to fight this usurpation by the ruling class; on the contrary it is part of the ruling ideology that individualizes and camouflages exploitation and oppression, while dividing the united struggle against the system, precisely because united struggle is alien to Queer Theory. Despite its origin as a criticism of traditional identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s, with its circle mentality and internal fights, it has failed to overcome precisely this type of identity politics. Since we can’t escape the omnipresence of power in society, it is also impossible to escape identities even though they are seen as fictitious. Since identifications “are, within the power field of sexuality, inevitable” (GT, 40), and we can at best hope to “parody” these identities, Queer Theory, which started out as a critique of identity politics, ends up exactly where it started: with identity politics. In practice, the old squabbles of who may represent whom continue unabashedly, just like in the radical feminist circles (and against them). Butler states aptly: “Obviously, the political task is not to refuse representational politics—as if we could.” (GT, 8). Any form of collective action and united struggle of all the oppressed becomes a fight, since “unity” and “representation” automatically lead to exclusion and violent oppression: “unity is only purchased through violent excision” (Butler, Merely Cultural, 44). This leads to an individualization of those who oppose the oppressive system under which we live. For instance, queer-feminist Franziska Haug complains that “the identity of the individual—origin, culture, gender etc.—becomes the crux of the matter” in queer-feminist debates, and “the right to speak and fight is being decided depending on the identity of the speaker” (Haug, 236). There is a competition about who is the most oppressed and thus has the right to speak, and who can’t be opposed. Against unwelcome arguments we often hear accusations along the lines of “you, being a white man/cis woman/white trans person don’t have the right to disagree with me, or revoke my subjective point of view.” While trying to exclude no one through “violent generalizations,” a countless number of identities are created that are supposed to cover all thinkable combinations of sexual, romantic, gender and other preferences and that are being administered in a range of queer cliques. Instead of a united struggle of all who want to fight against the system, this logic often leads to mobbing and exclusion within different groups. One queer feminist gives a vivid account of this in her paper, “Feminist Solidarity after Queer Theory” which almost reads like a desperate and intimate diary entry: Despite my qualms about the term bisexual, this descriptor provides a kind of home for me, when everywhere else feels worse. Both heterosexual and lesbian spaces have their own comforts for women, and I have often been excluded from both. I have also been told that I needed to change to ﬁt into those spaces—by acceding either to my true hetero-or homosexuality—and I have felt the moments of truth as well as the sometime hypocrisy and complacency of those demands … It is both necessary and troubling to seek out a home as a gendered or sexual being: necessary because community, recognition, and stability are essential to human flourishing and political resistance, and troubling because those very practices too often congeal into political ideologies and group formations that are exclusive or hegemonic. (Cressida J. Heyes, 1,097) From these lines we can sense the misery created by the pressures and the oppression of capitalism and what they do to our psyche and self-esteem. But it also shows the deadlock of identity politics. Even though the text sets itself the task of finding a form of solidarity between all feminists, it can’t imagine a unity that isn’t based on identity. In practice, identity politics leads to a split in the movement. For instance, in Vienna there have been two separate marches on women’s day on 8 March for years: one by the radical feminists (which can only be attended by women and, in one block, by LGBT persons), and one by the queer activists (where at first no cis men, but since 2019, all who see themselves as feminists can attend). A united demonstration was repeatedly declined by both sides. Against the background of the upswing of mass movements surrounding demands for women’s rights around the globe, and the dormant potential in Austria under a right-wing government, this example reveals the divisive role of identity politics. It is only natural that many people, in particular young people, question established norms in society such as sexuality and gender roles. This has always been the case and as Marxists we defend the rights of all people to express themselves and identify however they want to. But the problem arises here when the personal experience of individuals is theorized, raised to the level of a philosophical principle and generalized for the whole of society and nature. The Queer theorists tell us that being queer or non-binary is progressive and even revolutionary, as opposed to being binary (i.e. man or woman, which the vast majority of humanity is), which is deemed reactionary. Here, however, it is Queer Theory that shows its reactionary side. For all its radical talk against oppression, it opposes a united class struggle and promotes atomization of individuals on the basis of sexual and personal preferences, dividing the working class into ever smaller entities. Meanwhile, the whole rotten exploitative and oppressive edifice of capitalism remains in place.

#### The aff is always already a product of capitalism — neoliberalism over codes any possibility of academic transgression — forefronting identity politics or gender proliferation is an inadequate template for resistance

Pook 18 – PhD in Rhetoric and Professional Communication @ New Mexico State University, directs the LGBT+ program @ New Mexico State, MA in Communication @ Oakland University, MA in Philosophy @ University of Toledo [Zooey, “QUEER IS THE NEW CAPITALISM: NEOLIBERAL TECHNOLOGIES AND A BLUEPRINT FOR THE LEFT BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS,” May 2018, DKP]

Queer theory has lost sight of the ways political power and identity come to be and hold meaning in the present. Once a powerful advocate for queer concerns, queer theory today finds itself in an unfamiliar terrain with archaic tools in a rapidly evolving technological era. Concerns of the disciplinary age do not hold the weight they once did; Gay marriage has been legalized, LGBT+ characters have emerged on television, and information technologies absorb queer identity and experience along with everyone else’s. Deconstructing oppression does not hold much weight when LBGT+ bodies are being appropriated at rapid speeds by information technologies and neoliberal policies. For queer theory, the threat of extinction via irrelevance now looms. It is my intention to reimagine critique of identity and power through a reassessment of goals, tactics, and ontology, by way of a sober assessment of neoliberal politics and technology.

Queer studies began to emerge in the 1980’s with works such as those of Adrienne Rich, Catherine Mackinnon, and Eve Kosofksy Sedwick which questioned and interrogated an inherent heteronormativity that permeates Western ways of knowing and being. It was the argument of these scholars that without recognizing the internalized heterosexual structure within our thinking and culture, that critical scholars could not adequately grasp or make strides in the plight of gender and sexual inequality. Queer theorists are concerned with the ways that language and other symbolic modes of human comprehension are mediated through a heterosexual lens, such as those which dominate law, medicine, and the media, normalizing and disciplining bodies to heteronormative practices and knowledges, while violently excluding those who do not perform gender and sexuality in ways that adhere to heterosexual norms and logics (Wittig, 1992, p. 21-22). Thus, the task of queer theory is to locate, deconstruct, and reimagine these closed discourses through a plurality of techniques that open up possibilities for non-heterosexual and non-heteronormative expressions of bodies and minds. Queer theorists borrow from feminist theorists the notion of partiality, and place a necessary ethical and epistemological focus on the social location of the researcher and the possibilities that emerge from one’s distinct and unique social vantage point. Acknowledging partiality is in part a relation to a skepticism of the mastery of any discourse that works to promote discovery and ways of knowing that speak to a wider representation of bodies and ways of being in the world (Hall, 2005, p. 6).

The goals of queer studies historically speak to the disciplinary age and utilize identity politics as their tool of choice. Deconstruction of othering binaries, the dismantlement of heteronormative master discourses, and the dethroning of a patriarchal logocentrism are inherently the rhetorical tasks that mark the goals of queer theory. To locate critique, and open these discourses creates the possibility to set the “terms of, and to profit in some way from, the operations of such an incoherence of definition” within them, and this amounts to a “discursive power” through “rhetorical leverage” (Sedgwick, 2008, p. 11). This kind of critical and generative discursive work can be evidenced by landmark queer texts such as John Sloop’s Disciplining Gender and Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, which by way of evidencing and illuminating the construction of discursive heteronormative regimes that discipline and regulate the use of minds and bodies to heterosexual knowledges and practices, also move to create the possibility of agency through their transgression. Works such as Gayle Salamon’s Assuming a Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality, Roderick Fergusons (2004), Disidentifications: queers of color and the performance of politics, Jose Munoz (1999), and Jack Halberstam’s In a Queer Time and Place, are among the numerous works that continue this trend, interrogating the ways in which non-normative performances of bodies and identities work to open closed discourses of sexuality and gender, generating new conceptions of temporality and ways of being and knowing in the world.

It is my argument, and I think one that the aforementioned LaTour article sums up nicely, that identity critique has become stale and formulaic. In The Straight Mind, Monique Wittig argues that our task is to challenge and bring down the heteronormative discourses that order and limit our realities, and not simply to create new categories of being, as those new identities would simply be rendered and mediated through the same terms of heterosexuality if this unconscious and overarching system is not challenged first (Wittig, 1992, p. 21- 32). Despite the fact that this essay is a landmark and foundation text in queer theory, its tenets seem to have been forgotten or watered down through the materialization of a formula in the field. A common reading that has emerged in queer theory is one of equivalence, in which theorists conflate queer ways of being with heteronormative resistance. The examples are plentiful, as the aforementioned text by Jack Halberstam sits as a prime example, alongside the work of Judith Butler, and the work of queer rhetorical scholars such as Karma Chavez (2010), Gayle Salamon (2010), and Emily Dianne Cram (2012), which all take up performativity as a liberatory, ontological tool. It will late be my argument that Judith Butler’s widely popular notion of performativity in the early 90’s is what solidified this trend.

Academically, these works all utilize or attempt to theorize arguments that generally speak to the social phenomenon of identity politics, and the possibilities that arise with struggle based on racial or sexual difference. In short, identity politics attempt to bring a kind of subjectivity to notions of being and social organization, examining the ways that individuals are shaped and informed by their cultural experience, with an interest in how these social formations might challenge or speak to power. In queer theory, this has amounted to the ways in which queer ways of being might challenge or intervene in heterosexual discourses, thus locating selfdetermination as the ability to shape the ways in which notions of gender and sexuality are dictated. To draw a parallel, Malcom X famously wrote about the binaries and definitions of black and white, and Stokely Carmichael (2015) advocated for the recognition of Black experience to inform a new kind of politics in America, both referencing the need to disrupt and ultimately gain a voice in the master discourse, illustrating the function of a politics organized around a shared political and social experience (p. 150- 174). Thus, identity politics rest on the ultimate belief that the experiences, knowledge, and practices of those who exist outside dominant conceptions of power and privilege contain the epistemological tools to liberate both the oppressed and the oppressor, from the dominant paradigms that determine their relations, by revealing the inherent oppression in their lived relationships.

But what does a dominant discourse do or mean in 2018, when today, each click of the mouse turns information into capital, and data is packaged, repackaged, and sold all over the world in seconds, as economic wars are waged with virtual funds through algorithms? In his 1993 essay, “Feminism, Ideology and Deconstruction: A Pragmatist view,” Richard Rorty asks a controversial and important question: Even if all the logocentrisms, binaries, and technical discourses, which mediate heteronormative ideologies, were done away with, wouldn’t patriarchal power still persist? (p. 232). Rorty was speaking of the problematic force behind discourse, referencing systems of power and inequalities themselves, but today things are only more complicated as individual thought and expression are appropriated through our daily use of internet technologies. In short, today it is not only power itself which poses a reasonable concern to those doing discourse analysis, but the appropriation of discourse and power into the singular flow of information and resources in the networks of neoliberal power. It will be my argument that queer theory will need a theoretical overhaul to form a viable system of critique to make sense of and challenge the ways which we emerge as postfordist subjects through our mediation via information technologies. It is not through institutional discipline that power permeates our being any longer but through our orientation to exist through and for neoliberal networks via our participation on the internet. Today, dominant discourses are algorithms and all voices are equally commodifiable. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri speak of this totalization in their notion of Empire: “Empire manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow” (p. xii-xiii). Again, how can queer identity challenge power when neoliberal power is already queer, decentralized, without temporal boundaries, and completely immersive?

#### The impacts are resource wars, climate change, structural violence, and extinction — equitable governance structures are key

Parr, philosophy PhD, 15 (Adrian Parr – PhD in Philosophy @ Monash University, professor at the Institute of Critical Philosophy, UNESCO Co-Chair of Water Access and Sustainability. “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” June 2015, *Geoforum*, Volume 62, Pages 70-72)

In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.’ ( Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable. If the human race continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an inhospitable place for a great many species, people included. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how ‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show the discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments, and an inefficient and ineffectual public sphere that should hand the ownership and management of common pool resources over to the private sector. All are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘opportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite simply catastrophic. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this? Unsurprisingly, given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a neoliberal point of reference. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics. In the book I describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing. Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050. The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However, if we consider how much dirty manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions. In addition, there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems and immigrant labor. Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013 and Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699), stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability ( Parr, 2009). The observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be countered, but only if we first grasp how it works. Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as having either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each other. Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation, oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto advancing the social good. All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory. Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain closed to critique.

#### The alternative is to affirm the dual power model of the Communist Party – only the Party can provide effective accountability mechanisms to correct unproductive tendencies, educate and mobilize marginalized communities, and connect local struggles to a movement for international liberation

Escalante 18 (Alyson Escalante is a Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist. “PARTY ORGANIZING IN THE 21ST CENTURY” September 21st, 2018 <https://theforgenews.org/2018/09/21/party-organizing-in-the-21st-century/>)

I would argue that within the base building movement, there is a move towards party organizing, but this trend has not always been explicitly theorized or forwarded within the movement. My goal in this essay is to argue that base building and dual power strategy can be best forwarded through party organizing, and that party organizing can allow this emerging movement to solidify into a powerful revolutionary socialist tendency in the United States. One of the crucial insights of the base building movement is that the current state of the left in the United States is one in which revolution is not currently possible. There exists very little popular support for socialist politics. A century of anticommunist propaganda has been extremely effective in convincing even the most oppressed and marginalized that communism has nothing to offer them. The base building emphasis on dual power responds directly to this insight. By building institutions which can meet people’s needs, we are able to concretely demonstrate that communists can offer the oppressed relief from the horrific conditions of capitalism. Base building strategy recognizes that actually doing the work to serve the people does infinitely more to create a socialist base of popular support than electing democratic socialist candidates or holding endless political education classes can ever hope to do. Dual power is about proving that we have something to offer the oppressed. The question, of course, remains: once we have built a base of popular support, what do we do next? If it turns out that establishing socialist institutions to meet people’s needs does in fact create sympathy towards the cause of communism, how can we mobilize that base? Put simply: in order to mobilize the base which base builders hope to create, we need to have already done the work of building a communist party. It is not enough to simply meet peoples needs. Rather, we must build the institutions of dual power in the name of communism. We must refuse covert front organizing and instead have a public face as a communist party. When we build tenants unions, serve the people programs, and other dual power projects, we must make it clear that we are organizing as communists, unified around a party, and are not content simply with establishing endless dual power organizations. We must be clear that our strategy is revolutionary and in order to make this clear we must adopt party organizing. By “party organizing” I mean an organizational strategy which adopts the party model. Such organizing focuses on building a party whose membership is formally unified around a party line determined by democratic centralist decision making. The party model creates internal methods for holding party members accountable, unifying party member action around democratically determined goals, and for educating party members in communist theory and praxis. A communist organization utilizing the party model works to build dual power institutions while simultaneously educating the communities they hope to serve. Organizations which adopt the party model focus on propagandizing around the need for revolutionary socialism. They function as the forefront of political organizing, empowering local communities to theorize their liberation through communist theory while organizing communities to literally fight for their liberation. A party is not simply a group of individuals doing work together, but is a formal organization unified in its fight against capitalism. Party organizing has much to offer the base building movement. By working in a unified party, base builders can ensure that local struggles are tied to and informed by a unified national and international strategy. While the most horrific manifestations of capitalism take on particular and unique form at the local level, we need to remember that our struggle is against a material base which functions not only at the national but at the international level. The formal structures provided by a democratic centralist party model allow individual locals to have a voice in open debate, but also allow for a unified strategy to emerge from democratic consensus. Furthermore, party organizing allows for local organizations and individual organizers to be held accountable for their actions. It allows criticism to function not as one independent group criticizing another independent group, but rather as comrades with a formal organizational unity working together to sharpen each others strategies and to help correct chauvinist ideas and actions. In the context of the socialist movement within the United States, such accountability is crucial. As a movement which operates within a settler colonial society, imperialist and colonial ideal frequently infect leftist organizing. Creating formal unity and party procedure for dealing with and correcting these ideas allows us to address these consistent problems within American socialist organizing. Having a formal party which unifies the various dual power projects being undertaken at the local level also allows for base builders to not simply meet peoples needs, but to pull them into the membership of the party as organizers themselves. The party model creates a means for sustained growth to occur by unifying organizers in a manner that allows for skills, strategies, and ideas to be shared with newer organizers. It also allows community members who have been served by dual power projects to take an active role in organizing by becoming party members and participating in the continued growth of base building strategy. It ensures that there are formal processes for educating communities in communist theory and praxis, and also enables them to act and organize in accordance with their own local conditions. We also must recognize that the current state of the base building movement precludes the possibility of such a national unified party in the present moment. Since base building strategy is being undertaken in a number of already established organizations, it is not likely that base builders would abandon these organizations in favor of founding a unified party. Additionally, it would not be strategic to immediately undertake such complete unification because it would mean abandoning the organizational contexts in which concrete gains are already being made and in which growth is currently occurring. What is important for base builders to focus on in the current moment is building dual power on a local level alongside building a national movement. This means aspiring towards the possibility of a unified party, while pursuing continued local growth. The movement within the Marxist Center network towards some form of unification is positive step in the right direction. The independent party emphasis within the Refoundation caucus should also be recognized as a positive approach. It is important for base builders to continue to explore the possibility of unification, and to maintain unification through a party model as a long term goal. In the meantime, individual base building organizations ought to adopt party models for their local organizing. Local organizations ought to be building dual power alongside recruitment into their organizations, education of community members in communist theory and praxis, and the establishment of armed and militant party cadres capable of defending dual power institutions from state terror. Dual power institutions must be unified openly and transparently around these organizations in order for them to operate as more than “red charities.” Serving the people means meeting their material needs while also educating and propagandizing. It means radicalizing, recruiting, and organizing. The party model remains the most useful method for achieving these ends. The use of the party model by local organizations allows base builders to gain popular support, and most importantly, to mobilize their base of popular support towards revolutionary ends, not simply towards the construction of a parallel economy which exists as an end in and of itself. It is my hope that we will see future unification of the various local base building organizations into a national party, but in the meantime we must push for party organizing at the local level. If local organizations adopt party organizing, it ought to become clear that a unified national party will have to be the long term goal of the base building movement. Many of the already existing organizations within the base building movement already operate according to these principles. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. Rather, my hope is to suggest that we ought to be explicit about the need for party organizing and emphasize the relationship between dual power and the party model. Doing so will make it clear that the base building movement is not pursuing a cooperative economy alongside capitalism, but is pursuing a revolutionary socialist strategy capable of fighting capitalism. The long term details of base building and dual power organizing will arise organically in response to the conditions the movement finds itself operating within. I hope that I have put forward a useful contribution to the discussion about base building organizing, and have demonstrated the need for party organizing in order to ensure that the base building tendency maintains a revolutionary orientation. The finer details of revolutionary strategy will be worked out over time and are not a good subject for public discussion. I strongly believe party organizing offers the best path for ensuring that such strategy will succeed. My goal here is not to dictate the only possible path forward but to open a conversation about how the base building movement will organize as it transitions from a loose network of individual organizations into a unified socialist tendency. These discussions and debates will be crucial to ensuring that this rapidly growing movement can succeed.

### 1NC — PIK

#### We affirm the 1AC absent their call to be the expectation of the resolution.

#### Reject their call to make queerness an expectation of the resolution in favor of opacity.

Stanley 21, Eric A. Stanley is an associate professor in the Department of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. They are also affiliated with the Program in Critical Theory and the Haas LGBTQ Citizenship Research Cluster (Eric, “3. Clocked: Surveillance, Opacity, and the Image of Force” in Atmospheres of Violence: Structuring Antagonism and the Trans/Queer Ungovernable, Duke University Press)

Clocking

If, for some, gender only functions in a moment of negative equivalence that produces and does not simply echo what is assumed to appear in the social, what, then, might representation offer for a trans visual culture that resides on the side of flourishing? Or, what remains of the possibility of a liberatory moving image if the medium is moored to the conditions of collective detention? As I outlined in the introduction, mainstream lgbt organizations often argue for casting actors whose identities match their roles and, somewhat less common, for funding lgbt directors and crew to control the means of producing their own images. While these are necessary interventions, nevertheless, there is no guarantee that these adjustments will produce anything less dependent or more radically transformative. The representational regime I’ve been describing is an impasse where a diagnostic is easier to imagine than a corrective by way of speculative prescription. Rather than believing we might be able to “solve” the problem of the image; the charge might be to hold this contraction in the interval of freedom. 49

As is clear, representation has been produced as the primary site of struggle over diversity in the United States from at least the middle of the last century to our current moment. Positive representation, as a visual common sense, traffics normativity’s drive but with a decorative adornment that announces itself as departure. Even with little evidence of its ability to yield a more livable world, positive representation is still offered as the remedy for the years of degraded images that are the history of film. This substitutional logic, where representational change is argued to be analogous to structural change, provides positive representation as both remedy for and evidence of domination’s inevitable end— the promise of equality fulfilled. This respectable image, where neoliberal ideas of economic maturity and proper individualism transpose the stunning disturbances of gender, racial, and sexual excess to the failures of our insolvent past, reconfirm the idea of our progression. Yet this assimilatory representation is another impossibility, a disciplining intent on exiling pleasure and abundance, while ensuring hostile images are as much in our future as they might belong to the present. 50

For example, the last decade has witnessed a vast proliferation of trans representations that are offered as cure to the relentless economic, psychic, affective, and physical violence many trans people endure. These expanding representations are used to undergird dominant culture’s argument that progress is inevitably unfolding. Yet, returning to CeCe McDonald’s words that begin this chapter, we know that with this increased representation comes sustained or heightened instances of violence. While 2014 was named the “Transgender Tipping Point” by Time magazine, each consecutive year since has counted record numbers of murdered trans women of color in the United States. 51 Among our tasks is to attend to the grim reality that the expansion of even “positive” representation might not have simply a neutral corollary to violence but perhaps a causal one as well. 52

Marsha P. Johnson makes a similar argument about visibility and violence after a 1972 Arthur Bell interview in the Village Voice . Referring to a previously published piece, she suggested that the attention brought to the “girlies” (other gender-­ nonconforming sex workers) increased their harassment and led to their arrest later that week. Linguistic representation in the form of the article produced a broader social understanding of Johnson and her friends, including the geographies and temporalities they lived within which put them more centrally on the police’s radar. We have, then, the contradiction of the representational in that it brings us into the world, while also having the capacity to take us out. Here, the distinction (as contradistinction) between being and nonbeing also maps recognition’s fugitivity. 53

Again, rather than an opening toward recognition— a position where one can make a claim instead of exclusively being claimed— representation for Marsha P. Johnson and Duanna Johnson was the prefiguration of their undoings. Duanna Johnson’s being read as trans led to her initial arrest under “suspicion of prostitution,” a policing practice often referred to as “walking while trans,” in which trans women of color are assumed to always be engaging in sex work when they exist in public. Johnson being clocked, or being brought into the general field of representation as negative equality, led to her subsequent beating in the booking room, and perhaps even her murder.

Being clocked, or being seen as trans, is most readily deployed against a person’s identity as an attempt to destroy their/our coherence. Clocking adheres with the gripping force of catastrophe by recasting the violent act of misgendering as the ability to name the Other out of existence. Misgendering here is not a minor act of miscalculation but a way to reclaim the domain of gender and one’s position as author for those who are most threatened by its fragility. Officer McRae’s “he-­she” and “faggot,” the lacerating words intent on obliteration, enacts the double bind of recognition: being seen by the other brings you into the world— into the field of visibility. But for those already on the edges of vitality, like Duanna Johnson, it is often that which also takes you out of it. Through representation— both the cctv video and descriptions of Johnson in court— the defense was able to produce a reversal of guilt, where the party harmed is, via the magic of the law, transformed into the assumed aggressor. Johnson, and not the state, is made to hold the burden of proof— the surveillant gaze in action. 54

Tracing the racial and gendered parameters of recognition from Fanon and da Silva to Snorton and McDonald, how might we reorient the project of recognition, its prohibitions and its access, toward the nondialectical and nondevelopmental? Or, where might relief be found if we abandon the telos of the assumed subject to come? The brutal scene of Duanna Johnson’s beating, replayed against the composed testimony of the court, reminds us that recognition is not a smooth space of inevitability, even in struggle. Here, it’s the phenomenology of violence that compels us beyond a substitutive logic where life, and life’s recognition, is equally distributed.

Fanon turns our attention to the limits of recognition in the colonial context that I more fully explored in chapter 1. By holding on to the dialectics of structure, he also maintains the teleology of subjectivity, even for those deemed nonsubjects. For Fanon, revolutionary violence offers a way through the totalizing constriction of coloniality, the possibility to move from object to subject, however contingent. Given this, how might we push further on Fanon for those who must remain, even in the postcolony, as da Silva might suggest, “no-­bodies against the state”? This is perhaps an unfair question to levy against Fanon’s thought. Yet this “no-­ body” as nonidentity, or the negation of the negation of identity— not unlike Spillers’s caution against “joining the ranks of gendered femaleness”—might offer “the insurgent ground as female social subject.” 55

From Optics to Opacity

Duanna Johnson’s attack and its cinematic afterlife capture the structures of recognition and misrecognition, representation and disappearance, that constitute the field of the visual. While writing from a place of gender self-­ determination that works toward gender as an “insurgent ground,” what is left of our various analytics of recognition and the images that bring us into the world? Or, how might we return to the beating tape: not simply to offer yet another way to imagine what we already know— that anti-­Blackness, gender normativity, and violence are tightly bound in the production of flesh and that flesh’s destruction— but to ask, yet again, how this bind might be undone. 56 Further, what tactics of production and sabotage might liberate the image from its formalism? This question specifically addresses those trapped in the interval of seeing and being seen where subject and object are collapsed. As a praxis of imagination and survivance, we must pose it without a fantasy of closure. To put it another way, at the center of the problem of recognition lies this: How can we be seen without being known, and how can we be known without being hunted? 57

Being a “no-­ body against the state,” a position some are already forced to live, stands against the sovereign promise of positive representation and the fantasy of sovereignty as assumed under claims of privacy. Read not as absolute abjection but as a tactic of interdiction and direct action, being a no-­body might force the visual order of things to the point of collapse. On the issue of recognition and radical singularity, Édouard Glissant suggests, “From the perspective of Western thought, we discover that its basis is this requirement for transparency. In order to understand and thus accept you, I have to measure your solidity with the ideal scale providing me with grounds to make comparisons and, perhaps, judgments. I have to reduce.” 58 This reduction, which Fanon might call being overdetermined, is, as we know, unequally distributed. Glissant offers a totality of relation in opacity, the work of nontransparency that allows for nondialectic difference— the collectivization of radical singularity. Glissant continues, “Agree not merely to the right of difference but, carrying this further, agree also to the right of opacity that is not enclosure within an impenetrable autarchy but subsistence within an irreducible singularity.” 59 We might read the current order of popular trans representation to be a variation of agreeing to only the “right of difference,” as transparency is the precondition of visibility politics.

Opacity is useful here not necessarily as a practice of going stealth, residing below or beside the regimes of being seen but not known, although it might be imagined as such for those who find life there. For Glissant it is a method of solidarity without being grasped. 60 Here I’m suggesting it might be one way to theorize a radical trans visuality that attends to the universal and the particular as non-­interchangeable. Opacity with representation: an irreconcilable tension that envisions something more than the pragmatism of the transparent and its visual economies of death.

#### Making the ballot a referendum on the inclusion of identity in debate is violent — it requires oppressed groups to identify as defective and powerless while maintaining the Western belief that power is scarce commodity that must be fought for in the market of suffering.

Tuck & Yang 14   
(Eve Associate Professor of Educational Foundations and Coordinator of Native American Studies @ the State University of New York at New Paltz, and K. Wayne Assistant Professor in the Ethnic Studies Department @ UC San Diego, “R-Words: Refusing Research”, <https://faculty.newpaltz.edu/evetuck/files/2013/12/Tuck-and-Yang-R-Words_Refusing-Research.pdf>)

Elsewhere, Eve (Tuck, 2009, 2010) has argued that educational research and much of social science research has been concerned with documenting damage, or empirically substantiating the oppression and pain of Native communities, urban communities, and other disenfranchised communities. Damage-centered researchers may operate, even benevolently, within a theory of change in which harm must be recorded or proven in order to convince an outside adjudicator that reparations are deserved. These reparations presumably take the form of additional resources, settlements, affirmative actions, and other material, political, and sovereign adjustments. Eve has described this theory of change1 as both colonial and flawed, because it relies upon Western notions of power as scarce and concentrated, and because it requires disenfranchised communities to position themselves as both singularly defective and powerless to make change (2010). Finally, Eve has observed that “won” reparations rarely become reality, and that in many cases, communities are left with a narrative that tells them that they are broken. Similarly, at the center of the analysis in this chapter is a concern with the fixation social science research has exhibited in eliciting pain stories from communities that are not White, not wealthy, and not straight. Academe’s demonstrated fascination with telling and retelling narratives of pain is troubling, both for its voyeurism and for its consumptive implacability. Imagining “itself to be a voice, and in some disciplinary iterations, the voice of the colonised” (Simpson, 2007, p. 67, emphasis in the original) is not just a rare historical occurrence in anthropology and related fields. We observe that much of the work of the academy is to reproduce stories of oppression in its own voice. At first, this may read as an intolerant condemnation of the academy, one that refuses to forgive past blunders and see how things have changed in recent decades. However, it is our view that while many individual scholars have chosen to pursue other lines of inquiry than the pain narratives typical of their disciplines, novice researchers emerge from doctoral programs eager to launch pain-based inquiry projects because they believe that such approaches embody what it means to do social science. The collection of pain narratives and the theories of change that champion the value of such narratives are so prevalent in the social sciences that one might surmise that they are indeed what the academy is about. In her examination of the symbolic violence of the academy, bell hooks (1990) portrays the core message from the academy to those on the margins as thus: No need to hear your voice when I can talk about you better than you can speak about yourself. No need to hear your voice. Only tell me about your pain. I want to know your story. And then I will tell it back to you in a new way. Tell it back to you in such a way that it has become mine, my own. Re-writing you I write myself anew. I am still author, authority. I am still colonizer the speaking subject and you are now at the center of my talk. (p. 343). Hooks’ words resonate with our observation of how much of social science research is concerned with providing recognition to the presumed voiceless, a recognition that is enamored with knowing through pain. Further, this passage describes the ways in which the researcher’s voice is constituted by, legitimated by, animated by the voices on the margins. The researcher-self is made anew by telling back the story of the marginalized/subaltern subject. Hooks works to untangle the almost imperceptible differences between forces that silence and forces that seemingly liberate by inviting those on the margins to speak, to tell their stories. Yet the forces that invite those on the margins to speak also say, “Do not speak in a voice of resistance. Only speak from that space in the margin that is a sign of deprivation, a wound, an unfulfilled longing. Only speak your pain” (hooks, 1990, p. 343).

### 1NC — PIK

#### We affirm reading the topic with queerness as an expectation. Only that enables new understandings of time that resist heteronormative understandings of futurity and disturb normative time.

#### The affirmative affirms “new mappings of time.” — This is a PIK out of that — They choose to import a cartographic metaphor of “mapping” as a construct for thinking about time.

#### The use of “mapping” as a metaphor inherently brings with it a cultural baggage of governability and power that critical uses of the term can’t escape

Brennan-Horley 10, University of Wollongong (Chris, Creative city mapping: experimental applications of gis for cultural planning and auditing, <https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=4235&context=theses>

Cartography, GIS and the term ‘mapping’ itself brings with it a particular kind of cultural baggage. Maps remain a vital component of the western knowledge system traceable back to feudal times and have been used by state powers as mechanisms of knowledge production to constitute both subjects and territories as ‘governable’ (Wood 2002, Rose-Redwood 2006). In this tradition, territory is represented through conventions around co-ordinate systems, geo-coding and symbology, all of which Have carried through to the GIS realm. Despite cartography and western mappings being systematically unpacked by cultural geographers as tools for exerting power, they remain imbued with an unquestionable sense of objectiveness, masking other knowledge systems and ways of conveying information about places (Harley 1989, Rose-Redwood 2006). In this thesis, the perceived informational superiority of cartographic maps reproduced via GIS was repeatedly leveraged against as a means for effectively conveying research findings about the creative tropical city project (see section 1.6.1) to stakeholder audiences. These situations are discussed and elaborated in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

#### The baggage imported by the use of a spatial metaphor is that it functions to entrench a territitorialized understanding of space EVEN when it is used in fluid and critical ways

Cuddy-Keane 19, Emerita Professor, University of Toronto-Scarborough . (Melba, Imaging/Imagining Globalization: Maps and Models., https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329782576)

At the turn of the 21st century, a quick browse through journals or bibliographical databases exposes the proliferation, in the humanities and social sciences, of titles that use the word “mapping.” The applications are varied and suggestive, but the following selection conveys the striking recurrence of this trope: China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom (2002) Cultures in Motion: Mapping Key Contacts and Their Imprints in World History (2001) Feminist Cyberscapes: Mapping Gendered Academic Spaces (1999) A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares (1999) Literature, Mapping, and The Politics of Space in Early Modern Britain (2001) Mapping African America: History, Narrative Formation, and the Production of Knowledge (1999) Mapping Canadian Cultural Space: Essays on Canadian Literature (2000) Mapping Jewish Identities (2000) Mapping Male Sexuality: Nineteenth-Century England (2000) Mapping Memories: Urdu Stories from India and Pakistan (1998) Mapping Modernities: Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe, 1920-2000 (2002) Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (2000) Mapping the Empty: Eight Artists and Nevada (1999) Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory (2001) Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History (2001) Mapping the Sacred: Religion, Geography and Postcolonial Literatures (2001) Odysseys Home: Mapping African-Canadian Literature (2002) Orientations: Mapping Studies in the Asian Diaspora (2001) And last but not least: What Remains to be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race (1998) Even this selective list reveals a pervasive conjunction between the charting of space and the charting of knowledge, suggesting a link between the turn to spatial tropes and our increasingly globalized consciousness of the world. Yet oddly enough, while humanists and cultural critics have turned to the trope of mapping, geographers have been launching their most fundamental critiques of traditional cartographic practices. As Neil Smith and Cindi Katz point out, the discipline of geography was founded on assumptions of absolute space—“space as field or container, describable by a two-or three-dimensional metric of co-ordinates” (74). And the problem is that, although literary and cultural analyses increasingly recognize the fluidity, relationality, and multiplicity of the experiencing subject, the recent turn to geographic metaphor marks an uneasy gap between the destabilized subject and a discourse of spatial essentialism: “‘Space’ itself is rendered unproblematic, in startling contrast to the ‘everything flows’ of the social” (79). As Smith and Katz argue, since space itself is socially constructed and therefore as fluid and dynamic as the travelling subject, a slippage occurs between the material ground, or the “source domain,” and the metaphorical dimension, or the “target domain.” (69). Despite the multiplicity of locations being charted, the objective practices of surveying, circumscribing, and recording inscribe the notion of intellectual territorial mastery. Indeed, Smith and Katz speculate that it may be the extraordinary disruption and dispersion of previous knowledges and assumptions that occasions the turn to a non-problematized discourse: “space is largely exempted from such sceptical scrutiny precisely so it can be held constant to provide some semblance of order for an otherwise floating world of ideas” (80). Increasingly, however, the breakdown of absolute notions of space is transforming traditional cartographic practices. Despite Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra with its implication that “it is the map that engenders the territory” (166), it is equally true that new or previously unobserved spatial relations demand new strategies for mapping, with the boomerang effect that the new strategies in turn stimulate new spatial imaginings. Without denying Baudrillard’s insight that fabrication produces the observable real, we can also recognize the real as what intercedes in our fabricating, exposing the limitations of existing languages and stimulating reformulations of our fabrications. If globalization transforms the nature of spatial relations, then new mapping strategies are needed to depict those relations, and the strategies themselves will then prompt further reflection on the nature and conditions of our knowledge. To return, then, to the question of imaging globalization, we might describe the current predicament as one of employing a language inflected with territorialized constructions of space to express the complicated and shifting spatial dynamics of a deterritorialized globe. Again with recourse to geographers, we might say that an older, geopolitical language is being employed, with some hazards and difficulty, to track the complex processes of globalization. This distinction, I must emphasize, rests on a historical definition of the first term. Today “geopolitics” is often used to signify any locational approach to political issues or any political understanding of space, but the term as first introduced bore the specific connotation of location as territorially framed. Geopolitik was coined in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who—building on the work of German geographer Freidrich Ratzel—used the term to signify a Darwinian understanding of state power as dependent on territorial growth: stronger organisms survive by displacing the weaker. Although Kjellén’s theories had perhaps their greatest influence on the ideology that informed Nazi Germany, the geopolitical model is taken to be the dominant paradigm in the West until the end of the Cold War, fulfilling Halford Makinder’s prediction, in 1904, that the struggle for world power would focus on territorial control of Eurasia. As geographer Brian Blouet points out, geopolitics is a land-based ideology; it locates power in territorial magnitude and makes its goal the carving up of earth’s space. In contrast, Blouet identifies globalization as originally a maritime-based ideology deriving in large part from the Dutch; it offers an open rather than closed space paradigm, locating power in movement rather than bounded territory. It is important to note that the contrast is not one of bad geopolitics versus good globalization; both paradigms are subject to imperialist cooption. As Ian Baucom has recently shown, the Dutch seaborne empire was inherently imperialist; more immediately, although it may be helpful to describe the cartography of globalization as mapping fluidities, today even water threatens to become an article of imperialist control.2 But the geopolitical paradigm shifts to that of globalization as the world becomes increasingly based on the international or global circulation of capital, information, goods, and services, and the operative model shifts from bounded space to multi-directional flows.

#### It links explicitly to the aff and turns the aff—using the “mapping” metaphor for queer identities imports the baggage of cartography in ways that entrench state control and oppression

Walker 2000, Department of Geography University of Oregon, (Peter, Maps, metaphors, and meanings: boundary struggles and village forest use on private and state land in Malawi, http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/352/walkerp032800.pdf?sequence=1

There is a current vogue in social and cultural theory for the use of spatial metaphors— for example, the 'blurring of boundaries' between reality and fiction in popular culture or the ‘mapping’ of alternative sexual identities. The popularity of spatial metaphors has spurred critical reappraisal of the need to bring actual places and spatiality back into social theory (Moore 1998), echoing an earlier emphasis in geography on the ‘social production of space’ (Lefebvre 1991; Massey 1984; Smith 1984). In particular, a large literature on the 'politics of mapping' has 3 emerged that examines the ways maps are used as tools of political power (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988; Harley 1988; Kain and Baigent 1992; Mohanty 1991; Orlove 1991; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). As Peluso (1995) observes, mapping is an intrinsically political act that can facilitate largescale accumulation strategies that consolidate state control and work against the rights of local people.

## 1NC — Case

### 1NC — Presumption

#### Vote negative on presumption —

#### 1 — Tactics — the idea that one can affirm an expectation of queerness in the resolution through a reading is a deeply privileged one that ignores that queer exclusion in spaces like debate is a deeply material one reinforced by various power structures. The problem is not that the resolution is not being read in the right way, but the literal material structures of violence that hurt queer people. They cannot resolve those forms of exclusion and only our method/orientation has the ability to potentially challenge that violence. That means that you should vote negative on presumption because the aff cannot solve queer violence

#### 2 — Contradictions — Munoz and Dillon are contradictory theories — Dillon rejects the idea of traditional, linear progress while Munoz argues it can be used to gear towards a queer utopia — that undermines their rhetorical power and means you should hold the line on them applying both theories at the same time

### 1NC — Method

#### Their temporality de-specifies oppression, burdens the racialized subject, and detracts from decolonization.

Rosenberg 14 (Jordana, Associate Professor in the Department of English at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, “The Molecularization of Sexuality: On Some Primitivisms of the Present,” Theory & Event Volume 17, Issue 2, 2014 Johns Hopkins University Press, DOA: 1/5/2018) //Snowball //edited for gendered language

A caveat. The ontological turn may be or may become many things. It may have many layers to exfoliate and explore.12 And let me be clear; it would be reductive and absurd to argue that the ontological turn is itself a colonialist project. Nevertheless, we must reckon with the ways in which, in their current iterations, ontologies so frequently and aggressively drive toward the occlusion of the dynamics of social mediation. We need to ask why the lust for dehistoricization, for demediation, for a temporality outside of history, is flourishing now, and in this way.

2. Why Primitivism?

What is happening such that primitivist theoretical currents have cast themselves as the leading edge of Humanistic thought? In what follows, I will suggest that the primitivist turn has some yet-to-be-parsed relationship to what Sandro Mezzadra describes as the “violent (catastrophic) reopening of the question of the origin” that accompanies periods of transition – particularly the recent intensification of both the settler-colonial and financial character of capital accumulation.13 More specifically, I wish to argue that there is not only an escalation in the present of what Marx called “primitive accumulation” – or, the original and reiterated violence necessary to the reproduction of capitalism as a system – but also the narrative logics that accompany such escalation. In essence, then: object-ontologies are origin narratives. They are origin narratives that mediate a set of intensifications to one or more fangs of capital accumulation in the present. The fangs under consideration here are the intensification of settler colonial dynamics (including historical dynamics that are encoded into state and legal formations), and the “empowerment,” as David Harvey says, of the financial “moment” or arena of capital accumulation.14 Together, these dynamics produce an accelerated or particularly sharp version of Marx’s well-known diagnosis of the laws of capital’s constant self-expansion: the “annihilation of space by time.”

Is there a way to test these claims? Let us consider the first – that object ontologies are origin narratives. To the extent that the period we are currently occupying (otherwise known as “the rise of finance,” “neoliberalism,” “hegemony unraveling”) represents a set of shifts – shifts that one understands as internal to capitalism – this transition is accompanied by a set of violent practices of expropriation as well as a specific narrative dimension: a fantastical preoccupation with origins. I wish to argue that the turn to ontology is one such origin narrative – a narrative that takes the form of appearance of a methodology, but that is, in essence, driven by a figural logic.15

We know that object-ontologies are origin narratives not just because they are compelled to project forms of “ancestralness,” but more specifically, because they exchange frictionlessly between two sets of seemingly opposed orientations – origins and prognostication. Object ontologies, in other words, cast a twin temporal shadow: the ancestral and the futural. Or, the primitive and the brink. These two temporalities are linked, of course, primitiveness having long been the dialectical verso-face of millennialism. In what follows I will explore the contemporary iteration of this well-established and only apparently contradictory suture. I say “only apparently contradictory,” because, as Andrea Smith has argued so incisively, these two temporalities are locked together at their root: “normative futurity depends on an origin story.”16 We have only to recognize that for much ontological thought “normative futurity” is apocalyptic, to begin to see the relevance of Smith’s diagnosis for our purposes here.

But: what has any of this to do with sexuality? In what follows, I will argue that the study of sexuality offers a unique register for the ontological turn. Indeed, we might recall that “the object” has been a foundational question for queer studies. For Judith Butler, notably, that “object” was sex/gender, and unsettling the appearance of its ontological reality was the project of Gender Trouble’s genealogical inquiry. Butler sought to show how gender is a specific kind of object – what Kevin Floyd describes as an “ontological illusion” – and then to show how the occlusion of the illusory status of gender ontologies was inextricable from other ontological illusions that circulate through the social field.17

I am thinking here as well of Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner’s interrogation of the political contexts that produce the queer object and method of analysis. In “What Can Queer Theory Teach Us About X?” they suggest that “[t]he question of x might be more ordinary in disciplines that have long histories of affiliation with the state”, and offer that distance from the authorizing functions of the state has allowed queer theory the “power to wrench frames.” After describing a number of frames so wrenched, Berlant and Warner conclude that what Queer Theory does, is to “transfor[m] both the object and the practice of criticism.”18

Would it be unorthodox to suggest that what was once a methodological question attending queer theory at its outset – what is theory’s relation to its object? – has now taken on the character of an apriori answer? In other words, we no longer ask: what is the object of queer studies? Rather, the object of queer studies – at the present moment – appears to be the object.19

To the extent that queer studies has shifted focus from queer objects to objects more generally, this shift has a double resonance. On the one hand, it represents the critical force of diasporic and queer of color critique to broaden the understanding of sexuality to a set of conjunctural questions that contextualizes the ontological illusion of subjectivity within what Roderick Ferguson describes as the ineluctably political field of subject formation and the production of desire: “If the intersections of race, gender, sexuality and class constitute social formations within liberal capitalism, then queer of color analysis obtains its genealogy within a variety of locations. We may say that women of color feminism names a crucial component of that genealogy as woman of color theorists have historically theorized intersections as the basis of social formations. Queer of color analysis extends women of color feminism by investigating how intersecting racial, gender, and sexual practices antagonize and/or conspire with the normative investments of nation-state and capital.”20

Queer of color critique insists that queerness cannot be understood in isolation from a range of social formations. In doing so, Ferguson notes that this composite of forces (“racial, gender, and sexual practices”) operates with a double valence: an “and/or” logic. It’s this “and/or” that has marked queer theory for the past decade or more. Even as queerness remains a site of resistance to what Elizabeth Freeman has indispensably termed “chrononormativity” – or, what we might understand as the demands of racial capitalism for certain forms of productivity and submission to the status quo – as Jasbir Puar has made clear, queerness has also, in crucial ways, become folded into chrononormativity. For Puar, the conspiring between queer subjects and the nation-state is marked by the “incorporation of queers into the domains of consumer markets and social recognition in the post-civil rights late twentieth century … [as] queers [enter into] the biopolitical optimization of life,” and become “tied to ideas of life and productivity.”21 In both accounts, however, we notice the ways that queer studies has expanded its focus from explicitly “queer” objects to an intersectional or conjunctural account of the social world.

In a special issue of Social Text, “What’s Queer About Queer Studies Now?,” David Eng, J. Jack Halberstam, and Jose Munoz describe this expansion as queer theory’s “subjectless turn”: “What might be called the ‘subjectless’ critique of queer studies disallows any positing of a proper subject of or object for the field by insisting that queer has no fixed political referent … A subjectless critique establishes … a focus on a ‘wide field of normalization’ as the site of social violence.”22 It should be said that this subjectless critique is, itself, marked by a kind of and/or logic. As Andrea Smith has argued, while the subjectless turn opens up queer work beyond the kind of “ethnographic multiculturalism” that attends the neoliberal Humanities more generally, there is also a tendency for this turn to ontologize queerness itself such that the fundamental plays of power that constitute that social world become normalized and de-specified. Drawing on Puar, Smith argues that the “subjectless” subject of queer critique often unwittingly puts into place a racialized subject that bears the burden of subjectivity:

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“Puar’s analysis of biopower suggests that modern white queer subjects can live only if racialized subjects trapped in primitive and unenlightened cultures pass away” (49).

Smith’s focus here has to do with explicating the relationship between settler colonialism and queerness – tracing how this relation comes to be encoded at the level of the body, of desire, and in the habitus of the everyday. More than this – and more to the point for our work here – Smith elucidates how origin narratives embed themselves at the heart of not only queer subject formation, but queer theory as well. Building on her claims regarding the subjectless turn, and citing Elizabeth Povinelli, Smith argues that: “queer politics and consciousness often rely on a primitivist notion of the indigenous as the space of free and unfettered sexuality that allows the white queer citizen to remake ~~his or her~~ [their] sexuality. However, once this sexual praxis is engaged, it does not translate into solidarity with indigenous peoples’ land struggles. The subjectless critique thus calls attention to both the importance of Native peoples within scholarly work and their disappearance within this work. At the same time, it may be the case that it is in fact a subjectless critique that disguises the fact that the queer, postcolonial, or environmentally conscious subject is simultaneously a settler subject” (52).

To reiterate: the despecification of the queer object, for Smith, runs the risk of despecifying, as well, the historical forces that make “queerness” appear legible as an ontologically abstract force in the first place: “what seems to disappear within queer theory’s subjectless critique are settler colonialism and the ongoing genocide of Native peoples” (49).23 When queerness comes to indicate an ontological or essential form of resistance, we can lose ~~sight of~~ the conditions that make queerness as such legible in the first place. Scott Morgensen describes this in terms of a “settler rationality” at the heart of Western queer subject-formation; “settler rationality” might thus be understood as a way for queer whiteness to appropriate fantasized forms of primitive indigeneity, so to naturalize the displacement and extermination of indigenous people from the settler colony.24

Although this is a necessarily hasty summary of recent developments in queer theory, we might say that the broadening of the ambit of queer study beyond the queer subject follows an “and/or” logic: it both reaches toward historical materialist and (pace Ferguson) intersectional analyses, and it has the potential to “conspire” with the erasure of the specificities of racial capitalism and the underlying settler-colonial logic of modern Western culture. Let us simply say, then, that the subjectless turn has been at once a turn toward the historical specification of queerness in the context of racial capitalism, and, at times, a flight into an ontological queerness that at times attenuates such specification.

### 1NC — Politics

#### Their rejection of politics creates complacency and homonormativity. Political action doesn’t require embracing it, but its key to the queer utopia

Duggan and Munoz 10, Lisa Duggan is a Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis at New York University, and Jose Estaban Munoz is an associate professor and department chair of performance studies at New York University, “Hope and hopelessness: A dialogue”, chapter (pages 281-283) “Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory”, [2/20/2020], <https://doi.org/10.1080/07407700903064946> /EH

Lisa: Indeed. Hope is a risk. But I worry that we understate the full effects and meaning of that little word, risk. The hope we invest in our experimental forms, when bad sentiments lead us out of the ossified structures that constrain us, offers us no guarantee. Our experimental forms fail. We experiment under the conditions of life now – the material conditions of housing, health care and work and the emotional conditions of our own past and present intimacies created and broken. How do we transform and escape the conditions of neoliberal privatization and our own ‘‘family’’ histories? What happens to educated hope and concrete utopian thinking when we discover we’ve fucked up, we’ve been wrong, we’ve failed to cope with what we must deal with? What happens when we take the risk of hope and land flat on our faces, alone, abandoned and lost? Especially those of us who seek meaningful work outside the corporate form, or live beyond the limits of the normative couple? Those among us who forsake ossified modes of security, or who simply cannot enlist them for ourselves, take terrifying risks every day. Bad sentiments, pursued as escape, can lead to isolation, poverty and death. So there is fear attached to hope – hope understood as a risky reaching out for something else that will fail, in some if not all ways. What are the resources, then, for an educated hope that comprehends inherent risk and fear? What are the most reliable building blocks for, and the sturdiest bridges to, concrete utopias? I think these might be found in modes of expansive sociality that generate energy from shared collectivity. Expansive, innovative socialities produce energy for alternative, cooperative economies and participatory politics

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– because as we know, these can be exhausting even if not defined as ‘‘work.’’ Particularly as a basis for queer hope, loving, fucking and socializing otherwise constitute a practice that moves us toward Feeling Revolutionary, in our economic and political as well as (overlapping) intimate lives. Surely gay respectability politics and the sentimentality of the citizen who only wants to be ‘‘good,’’ now dominant on the US political landscape, do not lead us anywhere else, but only into the moribund institutions that deaden the body politic (marriage, the military). So bad sentiments can lead us (instead) out of dominant, alienating social forms, like alienated labor and the gendered family, and into a collectivity of the cynical, bitter, hostile, despairing and hopeless. This is how I find my people! Can these communities of the politically embittered then lead us, not necessarily down the slippery slope to entropy, but into a generatively energetic revolutionary force? Well, can they? If we cling to what Melanie Klein calls the paranoid schizoid position, perhaps not (see Klein 1975). In that infantile place, we reject the bad breast/world for frustrating us and cling to our impossible wishes for oral/political fulfillment, delivered under conditions we can control. One way of grasping the basis for embittered community is to see it as the political solidarity of the paranoid schizoid. And that’s not a bad thing. Regression to infantile intensities and demands can be vitalizing, can help us throw off the moribund maturities demanded by conventional social forms. Such regressions can operate as queer temporalities of anti-development and refusals of normative, Oedipal maturity. The paranoid schizoid pleasures can be considerable, and productive. But they can also lead to forms of anti-relationality, to anti-sociality, to queer refusals that go nowhere else in the world. Klein’s depressive position, if understood not as an achievement of developmental maturity, but as a sideways move out of an impasse (thank you to Kathryn Stockton), can lead (perhaps) to educated hope, to concrete utopia within the social realm.4 From the depressive position we accept the uncontrollable nature of political reality, we critique the social world but still engage it, we take the risk of hope with full knowledge of the possibility, even the certainty, of failure. We repair our relation to the social and political world that we have also wished to mutilate, explode, destroy. We campaign for Obama, then organize to pressure and transform the political institutions that disappoint or harm us. It hurts me to write a sentence as conventional as the previous one, as if I were an advocate of Rorty-style pragmatism, when my Facebook page describes me as an anti-normotic anarcho-socialist! This is the point at which I find the sideways move so crucial. Queer vitality, Feeling Revolutionary, may require that we straddle the Kleinian paranoid schizoid and depressive positions, escaping and re-entering the scene of educated hope in a contrapuntal dance, moving always sideways, never growing ‘‘up.’’ Can we summarize so far by simply and clearly pointing out that the neoliberal state and economy organize compulsory sociality through alienating institutions of work and politics? Noting that the related institutions of marriage and the family organize intimacy and sociality into domesticity and competitive consumption by regulating and constraining our intimate and social energies. Breaking out requires negative energetic force. That force threatens isolation, pain, poverty, prison and death, and it can also lock an embittered community into a romanticized embrace of the negative, a version of the paranoid schizoid position, producing (among other things) versions of what has been called the queer anti-social thesis.5 But that force can also lay the basis for a sideways step into political engagement in a disappointing world, via the educated hope, the concrete utopia, about which Jose´ has been so eloquent. This all leads me to postulate that hope and hopelessness exist in a dialectical rather than oppositional relation, and that the opposite of hope is complacency – a form of happiness that will not risk the consequences of its own suppressed hostility and pain.6 And complacency is the affect of homonormativity. Engaged anti-normative left queer politics is powered by the pleasures of bitterness, cynicism and pain, as well as by ecstasy, empathy and solidarity. But it gestures always necessarily through hope to the concrete utopias forged in our experimental intimacies and social forms. Hope is the primary way we bring ourselves to take the risk of breaking out of the constraints of present conditions. Hope is the energy we use to smash, not depression (grief, sadness, despair, hostility, anger and bitterness) but complacency in all its protean disguises. Jose´: When we talk about this dialectical tension between hope and hopelessness we must account for the force of the negative. But we don’t mean the negative in some grandiose subjectivity-shattering way. We mean living with the negative and that, first and foremost, means living with failure. This is to say that hopelessness and hope converge at a certain point. And we must then face reality in the form of an oftentimes disappointing world. Here is where we depart from some other queer writers and thinkers who write about abandonment to the negative and a subsequent rejection or evasion of politics. Queerness might signal a certain belonging through and with negativity. Often experimental intimacies falter. But those failures and efforts to fail have a certain value despite their ends. In this way we are calling for a politics oriented towards means and not ends. Klein described the depressive position as the only ethical one. But as Lisa indicates we cannot discount the importance of the paranoid schizoid positions and its pleasures – its negative force as an anti-normative resource for queer existence. Klein’s substitution of positions for Freud’s developmentally rigid stages lets us imagine the queer temporal choreography that Lisa describes. W.R. Bion’s notion of valence might also be useful to understand how a belonging in and through affective negativity works for an anti-normative politics (see Bion 1991). Valency, borrowed from chemistry, is the concept that describes the capacity for spontaneous and instinctive emotional combination, between two individuals or a group. Bion’s concept provides a provisional and partial account of how emotions cement social groups as guiding basic assumptions (what he calls bas). Thus as a group or a pair we share happiness and grief, ecstasy and sorrow, and so forth. This affective commonality is a site for commonality and even sociality. When we started this writing project it seemed like most folks assumed that we would be writing about ‘‘hope vs hopelessness’’ or at the very least ‘‘hope or hopelessness.’’ But as this collaborative project progressed it became clear to us that the most important word in our title was the conjunction ‘‘and.’’ Lisa began this dialogue by recounting a story a friend told her. In many ways friendship is the condition of possibility for this writing. Lisa and I share a certain emotional valency and we are part of a larger circuit of friends who also share shifting basic assumptions (for our purposes here, queer feelings). We write for and from an ‘‘and’’ in the hopes to better describe actually existing and potential queer worlds that thrive with, through and because of the negative.

# 2NC

## K — Cap

#### Absent vertical participation, the aff is useless — governments obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decision-making

Wight, IR prof, 6 – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney (Colin, “Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology”, pgs. 48-50)

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is zinculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Turns case AND explains broader bodily violence/control

Long 18, Research Assistant on the Connectors Study at Goldsmiths, University of London, where she is analysing civil and political citizenships and orientations towards social action in childhood, her research interests include: figurations of bodies and embodiment, sexual subjectivities, citizenship and sovereignty, political economy, political theory, queer theory, crip theory, and post-structuralist feminist theory (Robyn Long, 2018, “Sexual subjectivities within neoliberalism: Can queer and crip engagements offer an alternative praxis?,” Journal of International Women’s Studies, 19(1), pp. 78-93)

Crip/Queer Sex

Neoliberalism requires the regulation of sexuality to ensure a healthy and (re)productive workforce, built on the foundation of the stable, nuclear family. There are close connections between the workings of heteronormativity and able-bodied hegemony under neoliberalism, where the body becomes a site for self-regulation and self-correction to align with these neoliberal imperatives. McRuer (2010b:171) positions this within a theory of “uneven biopolitical incorporation”, in which the incorporation of some bodies, but not others, into the state must be integrated into feminist, queer, and crip discussions of sexuality. Bodies that do not conform to these frames are seen as problematic and in need of intervention. Indeed, where there has been attention paid to the relationships between sex and disability it has often been addressed within a heteronormative framework and a healthism narrative9 focused on positive health outcomes involved in sexuality (Drummond and Brotman, 2014). Here, heterosexuality becomes the ‘adult’ or ‘normal’ sphere (Beckett, 2004), and sexual and gender non-normates with disabilities are doubly invisible, doubly Othered, and doubly perverse (Shakespeare, Gillespie-Sells, and Davis, 1996). Thus to be LGBT/queer and disabled seems beyond the realm of what culture deems possible, let alone desirable (Inckle, 2014; Siebers, 2012). Sexuality becomes figured as the domain of the (hetero)normatively embodied, the possibility of gender or sexuality for people with disabilities is unacknowledged, instead we become “monstrous abnormalities, children in deformed adult bodies, who either have no sexuality at all, or if/when we do, we are irrevocably perverse”, (Inckle, 2014:392) possessing a sense of “embodiment conceived of as either lack or excess” (Garland-Thomson, 2002:7; Hirschmann, 2013). Memmi (1967) demonstrates the ways that the Other is always already seen as lacking, as “void” of some culturally valued quality, whatever that may be. This relationship between lack and excess in the Other cuts across categorisations of queer, crip, and ethnic subjectivities. This ‘crip excess’ frames people with developmental disabilities as hypersexual, and in some cases as predators, partly due to perceptions that, like queers, and indeed racialised subjects, they are all too capable of being sexual creatures (Wilkerson, 2002). Thus lies the contradiction of hetero-ableist conceptions of crip/queer sexuality: disabled people are conceived as docile and asexual, while queers are presumed a hypersexual threat. Consequently, Samuels has highlighted; if being queer is about sex and being disabled is seen as nonsexual, how can you even be queer? (cited in Meyers, 2002:171). Wilkerson (2002) addresses this in her analysis of the ways disabled people are denied sexual agency and power. As sexual agency is central to political agency, denying it is a central feature of oppression (Hall, 2002), as evidenced by the treatment of gay men in the 1980s under the administrations of Thatcher and Reagan10. Various queer and crip theorists have explored experiences of living simultaneously as disabled and sexual, positioning these embodiments as full of transgressive potential. Indeed, “paraplegics and quadriplegics have revolutionary [and queer] things to teach about the possibilities of sexuality which contradict patriarchal culture’s obsession with genitals” (Wendell, 1997:274), and this transgressive sexual potential allows for possibilities outside “heterocentric and phallocentric norms” (Wilkerson, 2002:51). The heteronormative model of sex, focusing on tessellating ‘male’ and ‘female’ genitalia for reproduction, further relies on ableist assumptions. The normative primacy placed on genitalia and breasts as the only, or at least most significant erotic zones negates attention to the multiple and various sites of eroticisation throughout the body (Schriempf, 2001).

#### 4 — They can’t win a link turn or permutation – neoliberalism is compatible with various moral orders and regulatory systems – at best the aff is a new vector for an unquestioned framework of neoliberal assumptions

Dardot & Laval 13 (Pierre Dardot, philosopher and specialist in Hegel and Marx, Christian Laval, professor of sociology at the Universite Paris Ouest Nanterre La Defense, *The New Way of the World: On Neoliberal Society*, pgs. 307-310)

As we can see, the strategic character of the apparatus assumes taking account of the historical situations that enable its deployment and which explain a series of readjustments altering it over time and the variety of forms it takes in space. Only on this condition can we understand the ‘turn’ imposed on the rulers of the dominant capitalist countries by the scale of the financial crisis. As we have seen, the latter has initiated a crisis of neo-liberal governmentality. Over and above the initial emergency ‘repairs’ (adoption of new accountancy norms, minimal control of fiscal paradises, reform of ratings agencies, etc.), what beckons is very probably an overall readjustment of the state/market apparatus. To ponder with some economists the possibility of a new ‘regime of capital accumulation’, replacing the financial regime based on excessive household debt, is only natural. To take the risk of deducing from this that a new regime of growth, exploiting mechanisms other than the inflation of property prices and financial assets, will spontaneously coincide with a direct challenge to neoliberal rationality is decidedly imprudent. But to forecast the imminent advent of a ‘good capitalism’ with healthy operational norms, durably anchored in the ‘real economy’, respectful of the environment, attentive to the needs of populations and, why not, concerned for the common good – such unquestionably verges on, if not an edifying tale, than at least an illusion that is just as pernicious as the utopia of a self-regulating market. We are definitely entering a new phase of neo-liberalism. It may be that this phase will be accompanied, ideologically, by a kind of ‘return to the sources’. After all, do not appeals for the ‘restoration of regulated capitalism’ rediscover the accents of the re-founders of the 1930s, counter-posing the good ‘highway code’ of legal rules to the blind ‘natural law’ of the old laissez-fairists? Perhaps – one never knows – under the cover of one of those swings of the pendulum typical of ideology, we shall witness a strong resurgence of the specifically ordo-liberal variant. This is all the less implausible in that, when not purely and simply ignored, it has long been relegated to a subordinate position by its Austro-American competitor.23¶ We would equally miss the strategic character of the neo-liberal apparatus were we to assimilate it to the Gestell of late Heidegger, or the oikonomia of second-century Christian theology, as Agamben indirectly invites us to in What is an Apparatus?24 To speak of a ‘theological genealogy’ of Foucault’s ‘apparatuses’ is to miss the fact that, if the apparatuses actually have ‘no foundation in being’, and if as a result they are fated to ‘produce their subject’, they do not thereby repeat ‘the division … in God between being and action, ontology and praxis’.25 Unlike the government of men by God, which refers to the theological problem of incarnation, they are constituted on the basis of historical conditions that are always unique and contingent and therefore possess an exclusively ‘strategic’, not ‘destinal’ or ‘epochal’, character. On this point[…]“Foucault’s remark about the specificity of the new problematization of government as it emerged between 1580 and 1660. If the activity of governing became a theme, it is because it could no longer find a model ‘outside of God, outside of nature’.26 In other words, far from it being the ‘theological inheritance’ of the government of men and the world by God which explains why the government of men by men becomes a problem, it was in fact the crisis of the model God’s ‘pastoral government’ of the world that freed up reflection on the art of governing men. What is valid for the emergence of the general problem of government also applies to the constitution of the specifically neo-liberal form of governmentality. The latter is neither the inevitable sequel to the regime of capital accumulation, nor an avatar of the general logic of the Incarnation, nor a mysterious ‘envoi of Being’, any more than it is a mere intellectual doctrine or an ephemeral form of ‘false consciousness’.¶ Nevertheless, neo-liberal rationality can be combined with ideologies that are alien to pure market logic, without thereby ceasing to be the dominant rationality. As Wendy Brown aptly puts it[…] ‘neoliberalism can become dominant as governmentality without being dominant as ideology’.27 No doubt this does not occur without tensions or contradictions. In this regard, the US example is rich in lessons. There neo-conservatism has become established as the standard ideology of the New Right, even though ‘the high moral tone’ of this ideology seems incompatible with the ‘amoral’ character of neo-liberal rationality.28 A superficial analysis might suggest that we are in the presence of ‘double dealing’. In reality, there is an accord between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism that is by no means fortuitous. If neo-liberal rationality promotes the enterprise to the rank of model of subjectivation, it is only to the extent that the enterprise-form is the ‘cell-form’ for moralizing the working individual, just as the family is the ‘cell-form’ for moralizing the child.29 Hence the non-stop eulogizing of the calculating and responsible individual, invariably in the shape of the working, thrifty and provident father of a family, which aids dismantlement of pension, public education and health systems. Much more than a mere ‘zone of contact’, the articulation of the enterprise with the family represents the point of convergence or overlap between neo-liberal normativity and neo-conservative moralism. That is why it is always dangerous to criticize moral and cultural conservatism in the name of the alleged ‘liberalism’ of its supporters in economic policy. For, in seeking to expose their ‘inconsistency’, one ends up revealing incomprehension of the difference between neo-liberalism and ‘laissez-fairism’ and, in addition, runs the risk of having to assume a kind of integral, systematic laissez-fairism to salvage the coherence of the critique.¶ However, the accord between neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism in no way entails that an ideological amalgam, combining ingredients from different sources, might not turn up to take over from an intellectual current that is largely anaemic today. The Blairite Left has already shown in the past that lyrical celebration of modernity in all its aspects, including the liberalization of mores, can perfectly well be combined with neo-liberal rationality. The possibility cannot be excluded that on another level – economic policy – certain elements of Keynesian doctrine will supply the practice of entrepreneurial government with reinforcement: temporary budgetary reflation, provisional bracketing of the criteria of monetary stability, measures aimed at checking market speculation, and so forth – all of them elements that do not involve touching the basic distribution of income between capital and labour and thereby reactivating a wage compromise comparable to the post-war one. By itself, however, such purely circumstantial and ‘pragmatic’ cooperation is not such as to dent the normative logic of neo-liberalism, so true is it that the latter can only be defeated by large-scale upheavals.

#### 5 — Homonormativity DA ⁠— the perm expands neoliberalism AND any link re-intrenches racialized violence

Ludwig 16, \*Department of Political Science, University of Vienna (Gundula Ludwig, 10-5-2016, "Desiring Neoliberalism," Sex Res Social Policy, PubMed Central (PMC), <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5080324/>, 13(4): 417-427, doi: 10.1007/s13178-016-0257-6)

Conclusion: Dangerous Entanglements

I agree with Duggan’s description of neoliberal sexual politics that “[t]his new homonormativity comes equipped with a rhetorical recoding of key terms on the history of gay politics: ‘equality’ becomes narrow, formal access to a few conservatizing institutions, ‘freedom’ becomes impunity for bigotry and vast inequalities in commercial life and civil society, the ‘right to privacy’ becomes domestic confinement, and democratic politics itself becomes something to be escaped” (Duggan 2003: 66). However, I want to add that neoliberalism does not only have an impact on sexual politics; the flexibilization of the apparatus of sexuality also advances neoliberal governmentality and neoliberal statehood and is therefore intrinsic to neoliberal governmentality. Neoliberalism is just as anti-social, anti-democratic and violent, as it is tolerant, flexible and pluralistic—not only are the former its hallmarks, the latter are too. Neoliberalism deploys the promise of tolerance, flexibility and pluralism in order to fulfill its anti-social, anti-democratic and violent agenda. The neoliberalization of sexual politics creates new forms of old power relations, which make subjects governable as sexualized subjects, incite a desire to a violent and anti-democratic state, and put nations, populations and subjects in unequal positions through employing a racialized and neocolonial matrix. In light of her diagnoses that neoliberalism is intrinsically anti-democratic (and we could add: also violent), Wendy Brown raises the question of “how much legitimacy neoliberal governance requires from a democratic vocabulary” (Brown 2005: 49)? As I have argued, despite its anti-democratic and violent elements, neoliberal governmentality does require the consensus and acceptance of the majority of the population—not least because neoliberalism is not and cannot be forced upon the population, as it is governed and therefore also relies on the subjects’ self-activation. Thus, neoliberalism also needs to be investigated as political project that engages people, deploys their hopes and promise them a good life, more freedom, wealth or personal fulfillment. Sexual politics need to be investigated as technologies of power that help to organize acceptance and consensus within neoliberalism. What are the consequences of this diagnosis of neoliberalism as embedded in homonormative and homonational politics, which help to incite an anti-democratic and violent state in political terms? Let me conclude with two thoughts. First, what follows from the entanglement of statehood with sexual politics as analyzed above, is that conceiving the state as a protector or guarantor of security limits queer politics’ emancipatory capacity because, as Foucault has taught us, the will and desire to address the state is already an effect of power. Given that the agenda of privatization and erasing all forms of alternatives contribute to the violence of the neoliberal state, queer politics that deploy ‘individual freedom’ and the ‘right to privacy’ also comply with neoliberal politics. Instead of struggling for the inclusion of some, queer emancipatory politics need to search for and invent new, different collective forms of organizing society, social relations, self-relations, care, kinship, and economy. Second, the analysis shows that emancipatory queer politics cannot be single-issue-politics—because sexual politics are always entangled with nationalist, racializing and capitalist projects and are a productive element in constituting them. Consequently, queer politics that aim to be emancipatory for everyone must address racialized, nationalist and capitalist biopolitics on a global scale. What Chandan Reddy problematizes regarding the struggles for obtaining recognition for same-sex partnerships in the USA also applies to the European and German contexts: Reddy critiques that these struggles are entirely disconnected from other social struggles such as those of (illegalized) migrants against the neo-colonial regime of migration (Reddy 2011). Reddy points out the paradox of struggles that focus on same-sex issues, which demand the realization of the promises of modernity—but at the same time these promises are only applied to people whose nationality is ‘proper’ because (illegalized) migrants were not viewed as part of these struggles in the first place. As long as queer struggles fail to address sexualized, racialized, capitalist, neo-colonial biopolitics on a larger scale, the dynamics that Foucault has described as crucial for modern Western biopolitics in a capitalist society cannot be overcome: a dynamics that not only divides humans into a group that is seen as worth of protection and a group that is framed as ‘disposable’ but also a dynamic where the ‘good life’ of the former requires the (social) death of the latter.

#### 6 — The alternative is mutually exclusive with the aff

Kipcak 20, leading activist of Der Funke, the Austrian section of the IMT (Yola Kipcak, 12-2-2020, "Marxism vs Queer Theory," Socialist Revolution, https://socialistrevolution.org/marxism-vs-queer-theory/)

For working-class unity!

For Marxists, unity in struggle is based neither on culture or identity, and nor is it a moral question. Instead, we emphasize the necessity of the unity of the working class as the only force that can end exploitation and oppression, due to its role in the productive process of capitalism. Our society is fundamentally defined by how we produce, because the production of food, houses, energy—everything that we need to live—is the basis for how we can lead our life. Is there enough food to allow for the development of science and culture beyond mere survival? Can science develop our means of production so that the amount of work can be reduced and time can be freed up for research, education and so on? The economic base determines how we work and live in our society and, as a consequence, which morals, laws or values are dominant (although this relation is not mechanical, as Marx’s critics like to claim, but dialectical.) Our society is divided into classes that are not defined culturally by whether someone is rich or poor (rather this is a consequence of the class someone belongs to). Classes are determined by the role they play in the process of production. In capitalism, the main classes are the capitalists, who own the means of production such as factories and land, and the working class, which has to sell its labor power in order to survive from the wages earned. The contradiction lies in the fact that the large majority of people produce socially in factories and companies in a worldwide division of labor, while the fruits of their labor are appropriated privately by a tiny minority. As this minority of capitalists produces in competition with each other, under the anarchy of the world market and only for their own profits, this leads to periodic crises, and is the reason why our society’s resources cannot be used to guarantee a decent living for all of humanity. This exploitation is the decisive basis for oppression and discrimination. Socialism means solving the contradiction of social production/private ownership by taking production into our own hands, under the control of society, that is, by expropriating the parasitic minority of capitalists. From this, it follows that the unity of the working class is rooted in the present conditions. A good life for the working class—higher wages, shorter working hours, a high-quality welfare system—can only be realized against the interest of the capitalists, because this would directly cut into their profits. Marxists see it as their task to make this shared interest of the working class as visible as possible to strengthen our unity, because only together can we overthrow this exploitative system. That is why Marxists fight decisively against any kind of division; that is, against racism, sexist prejudices and other forms of discrimination, regardless of whether the proponent of such views is a politician, a capitalist or a fellow worker. We are against any form of discrimination, but in contrast to identity politics we don’t perceive the interests of different genders, sexual orientations, etc., as fundamentally opposed to each other. On the other hand, the different class interests are (i.e. one must lose if the other wins). Objectively, there is enough wealth in our society to make a comfortable life possible for everyone. There is enough food, and we have the technology to reduce the working hours drastically and still get all the tasks of society done. We also fulfill all prerequisites for the socialization of domestic work (cleaning, cooking, child rearing, elderly care, etc.), which today is to a large part done within the institution of the family. This could be achieved by opening communal kitchens and public kindergartens, and investing in a good welfare and healthcare system. These measures would eliminate the material basis of the capitalist family, which locks women into an oppressive cage and is the basis for gender-and-sexuality-based discrimination. Without material pressure and dependency, human relations could evolve into truly free associations, which would be a step forward for all women and men. Science, education, culture and language would be freed from the profit motive and the interests of the ruling class, which are constantly dividing us and keeping us down. Human culture could reach unimaginable heights. In comparison, the modest demands of queer theoreticians for new vocabulary and free spaces show how limited they are within the narrow confines of capitalism. This, of course, does not mean that cultural achievements will happen “automatically” or “by themselves” simply by expropriating the big corporations and banks. But we must grasp the real relationship between material base and culture, between revolution and language concretely. The act of revolution means the entering of the masses onto the stage of history. It is the process of the masses taking their destiny into their own hands and no longer letting their lives be dictated by others. In all historical revolutions, the working masses have unleashed incredible creativity and set about removing the rubbish of the old society. In his text “The Struggle for Cultured Speech,” Trotsky describes how, after the Russian Revolution, the struggle against abusive language and swearing was carried out. In an extremely backward country that had only just begun to take up the task of revolutionizing society, at a time when “philosophy of language” wasn’t even yet a term, workers from a shoe factory called the “Paris Commune” decided in a general assembly to stamp out bad language in their workplace and to impose punishment if this decision was breached. Trotsky writes: Revolution is, before and above all, the awakening of humanity, its onward march, and is marked with a growing respect for the personal dignity of every individual with an ever-increasing concern for those who are weak … And how could one create day by day, if only by little bits, a new life based on mutual consideration, on self respect, on the real equality of women, looked upon as fellow workers, on the efficient care of the children—in an atmosphere poisoned with the roaring, rolling, ringing, and resounding swearing of masters and slaves, that swearing which spares no one and stops at nothing? The struggle against “bad language” is a condition of intellectual culture, just as the fight against filth and vermin is a condition of physical culture. This struggle is not linear, nor is it easy, because consciousness develops in a contradictory manner. As Trotsky pointed out in the same text: A man is a sound communist devoted to the cause, but women are for him just “females,” not to be taken seriously in any way. Or it happens that an otherwise reliable communist, when discussing nationalistic matters, starts talking hopelessly reactionary stuff. To account for that we must remember that different parts of the human consciousness do not change and develop simultaneously and on parallel lines. There is a certain economy in the process. Human psychology is very conservative by nature, and the change due to the demands and the push of life affects in the first place those parts of the mind which are directly concerned in the case. The struggle for a comradely, humane culture is therefore not simply over and done with after a revolution. However, the revolution creates the conditions in which the united, common struggle for such a culture can be developed freely and truly self-determined. This was actively supported after the Russian Revolution, when women revolutionaries were sent out into the whole country and promoted massive educational programs and organizational efforts. This Zhenotdel movement was later shut down by Stalin in 1930. Trotsky said, about the role of women revolutionaries, that they have to be the moral battering ram in the hands of a socialist society that breaks through conservatism and old prejudices. But there again the problem is extremely complicated and could not be solved by school teaching and books alone: the roots of contradictions and psychological inconsistencies lie in the disorganization and muddle of the conditions in which people live. Psychology, after all, is determined by life. But the dependency is not purely mechanical and automatic: it is active and reciprocal. The problem in consequence must be approached in many different ways—that of the “Paris Commune” factory men is one of them. Let us wish them all possible success. (Ibid) A huge gulf lies between the management-sanctioned, tokenizing LGBT campaigns of today, where class exploitation and psychological alienation from ourselves are still upheld, and the campaign organized by the workers of the “Paris Commune” shoe factory, who had full control over their own working conditions—including the language culture! It isn’t hard to imagine which of these two would take deeper roots and work more thoroughly. The aim of achieving a humane culture and language is understandable and correct, but the political orientation of creating a new language of equality, without also tackling the real social inequality is a dangerous illusion and, in the end, an impasse. A truly humane and free culture will be born out of the common struggle for emancipation of the working class, which will mold our consciousness, breaking through generations of prejudice and will throw present-day monstrous discrimination, racism, sexism, violence and degradation of women and minorities to the dustbin of history.

Should we call ourselves Queer Marxists?

What we have explained above has shown that, beginning with an understanding of what the world actually is, of how (or if) we can change it and with the practical conclusions that flow from this, Queer Theory and Marxism are irreconcilable theories. And yet, time after time, attempts are made to combine them and portray them as being mutually compatible. Rarely are these efforts more than a clumsy effort to appropriate the label of Marxism to give oneself a degree of radical credibility, while completely distorting its essence in the process. There are, however, some on the left, with honest intentions no doubt, who argue that we should adopt the label “Queer Marxism.” The most common argument raised by these people is that there is “something missing” from Marxism, i.e. that is unable to comprehend the specific oppression of sexualities. It should be obvious from the present article that we have provided sufficient arguments to counter these claims. [image omitted] However, another popular argument has to do with tactics, which goes more or less like this: one should stand on a firm, Marxist base, but in order to make Marxism more appealing to people of all identities, and because of its bad reputation, calling oneself Queer Marxist can send a clear signal of inclusiveness. And what harm could it do if it doesn’t work immediately? If it doesn’t help it doesn’t hurt, goes the argument. A relatively extensive demonstration of this way of thinking is provided by Holly Lewis in her book The politics of everybody (2016) which we will therefore deal with briefly here. In her book, Lewis refers rather self-consciously to the “old, unfashionable approach of Marx’s materialism,” including its orientation towards the working class in order to change the world (Lewis, 91). She wrote her book purportedly to render Marxism tempting for queer and feminist activists and conversely to acquaint Marxists with the politics and origins of feminist, queer and trans politics (Lewis, 14). On the surface, Queer Marxism might appear to some as a good way of winning queer people to Marxism and integrating them into the struggle against capitalism. But stating that we need a “Queer Marxism” inevitably leads down the road of differentiating it from “Classical Marxism,” precisely to justify why there has to be a “Queer Marxism” in the first place. This creates a fissure between the two and opens the door through which alien class ideas and ideological concessions seep in. After spending a good third of her book trying to explain the fundamentals of Marxism, Holly Lewis arrives at exactly this point. As a feminist Queer Marxist she wants to incorporate international queer, trans and intersex perspectives into the materialist, Marxist analysis of sex and gender (Lewis, 107). And what are these particular perspectives that in her view can explain the specific forms of oppression better than “boringly normal” Marxism? Here, all the old arguments are unpacked, such as Marx and Engels being children of their time and therefore, of course, sexist, with Engels being a bit more of a sexist than Marx. Then she constructs, as revisionists often do, an alleged contradiction between Marx and Engels, with the latter supposedly not correctly grasping the nature of women’s oppression, which his book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State apparently confirms. She rejects the Marxist understanding of the role of the family in capitalism and gradually undermines the very foundations of Marxism, including its historical-materialist analysis. In regard to the gender question, she finally gets to the point of vague and unclear formulations about the alleged (in)existence of genders. However, even on this blurred philosophical basis it is almost impossible for her to employ any aspect of Queer Theory in a positive way. But she does find a straw to clutch at: the concept of performance, which postulates that gender roles are internalized through repetitive actions. Far from being incompatible with materialist analysis, Butler’s intervention meshes nicely with Fields’[3] conception of ideology as a repetition of actions originating in social relations, but actions that continue to be normalized through habit, experience, and the organizational logic of a given society. (Lewis, 199) And thus Marxism and Queer Theory are presented, not as mutually exclusive and serving diverging class interests, but as coexisting peacefully, with one being able to borrow individual bits and pieces and mixing them together haphazardly. We need to be clear here. Marxism is based on a set of laws derived from nature and, therefore, the more scientific insight we have of nature, the more we can develop these general laws. It is necessary to constantly test one’s analyses against reality and, if necessary, adapt it, as well as exploring new phenomena deeply and thoroughly. However, that is completely different from capitulating to bourgeois ideologies and compromising with idealism. Lewis’ biggest mistake is not to explain that ideologies are hardened in the minds of people through rituals and performance (which is a true, albeit mundane, observation), but that, starting from this detail, she makes Queer Theory seem like an acceptable “ally.” Ultimately, the crux of the matter is that she doesn’t have an understanding of the consequences of bourgeois ideologies for the working class, and of the role of bureaucratic leaders and intellectuals, who take up these ideologies within the movement and the organizations of the working class. The ruling class has many ways of corrupting the leadership of the workers’ movement and of supporting those individuals within the movement who advocate and spread (petty-) bourgeois ideologies. There are jobs in the government and the state apparatus to be given away, there is the so-called “social partnership” between capital and labor, through which bureaucrats of trade unions and workers’ parties meet eye to eye with the bourgeoisie. Instead of defending the interests of the working class, to them, the workers are simply pawns that can be moved to defend their own bureaucratic positions. They want to turn workers’ struggles on and off like tap water, in order to strengthen their bargaining power. Petty-bourgeois ideologies such as feminism that divert attention away from class struggle, but have a “left image,” are enthusiastically taken up by bureaucrats as they serve their own interests well. Intellectuals at universities who defend their funding, positions and research institutions develop these ideologies to justify their practice and, whether knowingly or not, throw sand into the eyes of activists who are looking for answers. In the abstract, Lewis agrees that Queer Theory & Co. can indeed be used in a reactionary way, and that they are an expression of an economically insecure petty bourgeoisie. However, she is silent about the concrete role these ideologies play within social movements. She thus ends up serving as a left fig leaf for reformism and the bureaucracy. This becomes obvious whenever she writes about concrete, historical events, for example the betrayal by the Second International. In 1914, most workers’ parties of Europe that were at that time united within the Second International voted in their respective national parliaments in favor of the war credits for the First World War. They thus sanctioned an imperialist war in the interest of the capitalists. Only a handful of revolutionaries, including Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, resisted this wave of chauvinism. How does Lewis explain this historic betrayal by the social-democratic leadership? According to her, the representatives of the social-democratic parties agreed to WWI and capitulated to national chauvinism because Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky, in their writings such as the Erfurt Program, had popularized a superficial understanding of the ideas of Karl Marx, and “such distortions ultimately led the members of the Second International to vote that socialist parties should back their respective nations in World War I” (Lewis, 63). This depiction, however, turns reality on its head, because it ignores the context in which the distortions of Marxism appeared around that time. Before WWI, a layer of bureaucrats had become accustomed to their quite comfortable lives as parliamentarians, and in the face of a long period of economic boom, declared revolution to be unnecessary. Their betrayal was not a simple misunderstanding of the “pure” teachings of Capital, not just an ideological battle on equal terrain, but an expression of a bureaucratic layer within the workers’ parties who preferred their comfortable positions to harsh class conflict, including revolutionary war against “their own” national capitalists. The result was not just an ideological deviation, but translated into concrete support for the mass slaughter of workers in the war, and the betrayal of numerous revolutionary movements in the years after the war: in Germany, Austria, Hungary and so on. This was how the opportunity to win the battle for international socialism, which was within reach, was drowned in blood, and ultimately led to the rise of fascism in Europe. Lewis’ description of the trade unions in the USA in the 1980s and 1990s goes in the same direction, papering over the negative role of the bureaucracy within the movement. Seeking to explain why the traditional organizations of the working class organize so few “queer and trans persons,” she writes: However, the failure may not be in the policies or habits of unions and organizations, but in the fact that labor and socialist organizations themselves have declining influence on the working class under neoliberalism. Ironically, working-class queer and trans people can transform working-class politics by strengthening the deteriorating structures of working-class power. (165) And: The offshoring of jobs had brought about a continual decline of union membership during the 1980s and 1990s … For all the inadequacies of American business unions, it would have required a strong international labor movement to challenge neoliberalism. (208–209) So what, according to her, are the reasons for the decline in trade union membership? For her, this took place because of “Neoliberalism,” which pressured the trade unions with threats of offshoring. The second serious reason she gives is the weakness of the international trade union movement, and only after these factors does she see that it is somehow also relevant that the unions have a pro-business stance. This depiction actually ends up arguing that any struggle at that time was futile to begin with. It also covers up the role of the right-wing trade union bureaucracy that was observing silently as a number of big attacks by the bosses and the government were carried out. For instance, when president Reagan scandalously broke the PATCO strike of air traffic controllers in 1981 by using military strikebreakers and subsequently banning 19,000 workers from working in this sector ever again, the leaders of the AFL-CIO didn’t even think of organizing solidarity strikes in defense of the PATCO workers. In 1995, the AFL-CIO leadership closed their international department and replaced it with a “solidarity center,” which received 90 percent of its budget from the state and, for instance, supported the 2002 coup against the Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. They thus directly contributed to the bad state in which the international workers’ movement found itself! More union money was used to finance the party machinery of the Democrats than for organizing campaigns on workers’ rights. And the list goes on. This clearly shows that any line of argument that ignores the specific role of bureaucracy inevitably ends up covering up their treacherous stance. Failing to understand how real movements and their leaderships progress, and how (petty-) bourgeois ideologies play into the hands of counterrevolutionary interests within the movement lead to the erroneous conclusion that the question of “Queer Theory vs. Marxism” is a fair competition between two equally valid ideas. But capitalists do not only put pressure on minorities and oppressed layers of society, but also on revolutionaries. In the trade unions, critical shop stewards are isolated, in the mass workers’ parties, Marxists are vilified or expelled, and in the job market it is generally not the best of credentials to be a member of any revolutionary organization. It is vitally necessary to firmly defend the ideas of Marxism if we wish to achieve victorious revolutions, the alternative being defeat. However, we have to take account of the fact that the ruling class and their stooges will always try to make this as difficult as possible. Academics who try to rob Marxism of its revolutionary content in the name of some new or trendy ideas do not simply serve the interests of the ruling class directly by taking up what may appear as “harmless ideas,” but are fundamentally petty bourgeois—such as feminism, with all its ideas about blaming men as a whole for the oppression of women, rather than seeing this oppression as flowing from the division of society into classes. The reformist leaders of the trade unions and workers’ parties have also perfected their skills in delivering radical speeches at internal meetings, only to serve as the most faithful supporters of capital in society as a whole. United struggle is the most important weapon that the working class possesses and which can free us. Marxism defends this unity consistently until the end. Marxism therefore struggles for the inclusion of all people, independently of their ethnic origins, gender, identity, religion, etc., into the struggle against the ruling class, the capitalist system and all forms of oppression that come with it. We reject any ideology that leads to a practice that blocks, slows or makes impossible this struggle, no matter how “modern” or radical it may appear to be. This also includes Queer Theory. The so-called “improvement” of Marxism with Queer or feminist add-ons means the ideological weakening of Marxism. This weakening ultimately does not serve to win people of different identities and sexual orientations over to our movement. On the contrary, it is used as a means whereby (petty) bourgeois careerists can hide behind what seems to be a radical position while using the labor movement and its organizations to promote their own personal interests. Therefore to blur the dividing line between Marxism and Queer Theory is a hindrance in our fight for the emancipation of humanity from all forms of exploitation and oppression. Only if we break with the bourgeoisie at all levels (the ideological as well as the practice of class collaboration and corruption through state money and posts that flow from it) can we overthrow capitalism and take our destiny into our own hands. We invite all anti-capitalists to join us in this struggle.

#### The aff’s depiction of the state as a locus of violence and power feeds right-wing condemnation of the government and ensures the perpetuation of neoliberal violence

Parenti, Sociology PhD, 15 (Christian Parenti, former visiting fellow at CUNY's Center for Place, Culture and Politics, as well as a Soros Senior Justice Fellow, teaches in the Liberal Studies program at New York University, interview with Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist who lives and works in the Rust Belt, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” May 17, 2015, http://ouleft.sp-mesolite.tilted.net/?p=1980)

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner?¶ Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into.¶ This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country. There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle.¶ When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it.¶ Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government.¶ We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government.¶ The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue.¶ Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole. More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can.¶ Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month.¶ As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital.¶ I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives?¶ It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems. A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation.¶ You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news.¶ For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this.¶ Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local. On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left.¶ Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources?¶ Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly ~~stand up to~~ rebuff them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated.¶ If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.¶ Part Two:¶ Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces?¶ Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left."¶ Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas.¶ Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition. Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism.¶ Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom.¶ Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government. What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US?¶ Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild.¶ Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc. But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit.¶ This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear.¶ However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

#### 2 — Absent the alt, the aff fails

Ollivain 21, writer at Honi Soit (Claire Ollivain, 10-5-2021, "What is queer theory without action?," Honi Soit, https://honisoit.com/2021/10/what-is-queer-theory-without-action/)

In the original 1976 Homo Soit, an article called Gay Studies written by Dennis Altman speculated that “In a University as academically conservative as the University of Sydney it is probably utopian to even talk about gay studies.” Yet surprisingly, Altman does not go on to argue for gay studies — at least not as an academic discipline in isolation — even questioning whether it is “an area of great importance.” While acknowledging that Monash and Flinders Universities had some form of gay studies, and the agitation it took to win a feminist philosophy course at USyd two years prior, Altman argued that more relevant than lobbying for gay studies was to counter the present moralising attitudes toward homosexuality in courses like law, medicine and education. His main concern was that a course on gay studies would be too insular, leaving “untouched” the distorted perception of gay people in wider society. 45 years later, gay studies is no utopian horizon but a reality at the University in the form of queer theory, taught in the Department of Gender and Cultural Studies and exerting an influence on most Arts courses. My English degree introduced me to thinkers from Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Lauren Berlant to Jack Halberstam; the countercultural queer theorists I read were among the most transformative for my view of the world and literature. However, as we face the ever-increasing corporatisation of higher education, the question must be asked: what is queer theory’s relationship to the University’s constant institutional violence, inflicted by casualisation, course cuts and surveillance? Has its marginal and oppositional status — the political radicalism denoted by ‘queer’ — been domesticated with its popularity and its position within the ivory tower? What does the existence of queer theorist university bosses indicate about the field’s proclivity for co-optation by the mainstream? Attacks from outside academia in the culture wars would seem to suggest that the marginal status persists; that queer studies and other fields of critical theory pose a continual threat to conservatives. In How To Be Gay (2012), David M. Halperin recounts the typical shape of this hand-wringing rhetoric, writing that “others have long suspected that institutions of higher education indoctrinate students into extremist ideologies, argue them out of their religious faith, corrupt them with alcohol and drugs, and turn them into homosexuals.” Regardless of what conservatives’ long standing fears suggest, radical thought faces the looming threat of extinction within universities, where social problems are commonly approached through a cushy, individualist, vocational lens. The introduction of compulsory Industry and Community Projects Units that suggest we can solve ‘real-world problems’ like sexism through short-term group projects has eaten up space in our degrees that were once for theoretical units and electives. Universities are prone to treating queer studies as mere fodder for vocational diversity training modules, encouraging the next generation of workers to believe that the capitalist economy can be mended through diversity. This is not the fault of staff per se but a structural problem of institutions where everything must be justified under the banner of profitability, while an axe hangs over staff’s heads through endless restructures. The relationship between detached academic theorising about social movements and the embodied knowledge produced within those movements has long been a contested one. Queer studies is not inherently revolutionary, especially not in isolation from analysis of class or race. During the heyday of post-structuralism, queer studies was dominated by critique — a humanities-wide project characterised by a suspicious style of unmasking texts for symptoms of deeper power structures. Critique staked a claim to being the only politically radical method available, yet its methods have since attached themselves to views across the political spectrum, mutating into everything from climate change denial to anti-vax movements. Nearing the turn of the century, essays like Sedgwick’s Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading (1997) began self-questioning queer studies’ beholdenness to critique. Sedgwick suggested that a demystified view of oppression gained through critique — or paranoid reading — did not necessarily enjoin one to take action, suggesting we take seriously pleasurable and affirmative modes of reading as well. Moving towards embodied approaches to interpretation that inspire hope rather than mere scepticism, the line of reasoning went, could better conceive of imaginative possibilities beyond the current state of things. Likewise, in The Militancy of Theory (2011), Michael Hardt suggested that critique’s ‘melancholic’ disposition made it insufficient to “transform the existing structures of power and to create alternative social arrangements.” Abstracted from the terrain of political struggle and situated within neoliberal institutions, queer theory can be a demobilising force rather than a revolutionary one. The 21st century turn towards postcritique — finding new modes of reading beyond ideological criticism — has recognised the limits of critique yet fallen into similar political stalemates. When framed as a response to the denigrated humanities, postcritique risks capitulating to conservative demands of universities to be ‘uncritical’. FASS Dean Annamarie Jagose’s lambasting of “the clear-eyed, all-knowing, hermeneutically suspicious position of the protestor who sees through the spin” is direct from the discourse of postcritique — a case in point for how the turn away from critique can sometimes be a reactionary one. One issue with postcritique is that its attention to affect plays into the individualist logic of neoliberalism when the larger political context is disregarded. As students schooled in queer theory, we must interrogate what it means to turn from the collectivistic to the individual, from the philosophical to the vocational, and what impact theory has on political engagement in the world. For one, it should motivate us to fight against the current proposed changes to Gender and Cultural Studies at USyd that threaten the autonomy of the Department; even the smallest chipping away of the field can set a precedent for future decline. As we become entangled in our commitments to individual research projects within the University, we can lose sight of the life-or-death stakes of the collective struggle that our research concerns. The perception of queer studies as insular and parochial continues, particularly when situated within institutions inaccessible for many. But queer studies can be political work and it can compel us to go out on the streets and fight for queer liberation; and secondly, for a university where theory doesn’t just radically anticipate a better world in an abstract sense but is part of the work creating it.

## Case

# 1NR

## PIK — Mapping

#### Their use of mapping functions as a terministic screen that directs are attention to the metaphor itself

Cole & Renagar 16 Kirsti Cole is an Associate Professor of Rhetoric, Composition, and Literature at Minnesota State University, Valerie Renegar, Ph.D. · Associate Professor of Communication Studies, Southwestern University, The "Wicked Stepmother" Online Maternal Identity and Personal Narrative in Social Media In Taking the Village Online: Mothers, Motherhood and Social Media Ed. By Basden Lorin Arnold.

The language used in popular culture to describe stepmothers frames the attention of American culture in particular ways. Burke indicates that our language creates a "terministic screen" that "directs the attention into some channels rather than others" (45). This means that particular language choices and characterizations shape an understanding of the things that they describe. Furthermore, both those who make these linguistic choices and the audiences who hear them are encouraged to direct their attention to certain features of what is being described while other aspects of what is being described are cast into shadow or made less noticeable. Burke explains, "Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality" (45). A terministic screen, therefore, focuses attention on particular characteristics by bringing them to the forefront, whereas more complex or nuanced understandings of the subject at hand are far less prevalent. In the abbreviated language of online discussion boards, the direction of participant attention towards only certain features is all the more pronounced. Paul Stob summarizes Burke's thinking, "terms direct our attention, goading us to notice some things at the expense of other things" (139). Not only does a terminology direct attention in particular ways, but it also has embedded within it particular conclusions. Discussing the "nature of our observations," Burke explains, "much that we take as observations about 'reality' may be but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms" (46). From this, we argue that the repeated circulation of the "wicked stepmother" or "step-monster" representation highlights particular negative aspects of the stepmother. Because these terms are so prevalent in American culture, the terministic screens that they create make it difficult for individuals to consider stepmothers or stepmothering without first thinking about the way that they have been negatively framed. We argue that the constant repetition of the "step- monster" and "wicked stepmother" tropes in popular culture, including social media and online environments, poison the meaning of "stepmother" and the relationships that it describes. In a finding that suggests the possible effect of these embedded conclusions about stepmothers, a three-decade longitudinal study indicates that children often come to appreciate having a stepfather but the relationship with the stepmother is more difficult and resentment is more intense (Martin 3). In other words, the prevalence of the negative terministic screens surrounding stepmothers resonate with the difficult and resentful relationship that many children report having with their stepmothers. The negative terministic screen provides a lens for describing stepmothers in ways that then replicate and entrench the negative framing.

#### Imposition of a special “mapping” metaphor onto an analysis of “time” crushes solvency and turns the case

Sinha 15, Chris Sinha University of East Anglia . (Chris, 'Metaphors, maps and fusions: space, time and space-time', https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309043473\_'Metaphors\_maps\_and\_fusions\_space\_time\_and\_space-time')

On the basis of their investigations in, respectively, Tzeltal and Yélî Dnye, Brown (2012: 10) concludes that ‘there is no automatic transfer of spatial frames of reference to those for time’; and Levinson and Majid (2013: 10) that their study ‘casts doubt upon a strong universal tendency for systematic space–time mapping’. Le Guen and Balam (2012: 14) investigated, in a multi-methodological study, both D-time and S-time in Yucatec Maya, finding that neither of them is mapped to a metaphoric time line. S-time, they report, is conceptualized as ‘a succession of completed events not spatially organized’, in which ‘cyclicity’ is attributed to both single events and event sequences. They conclude that ‘the use of a geocentric [spatial] FoR [frame of reference] instead of providing a way of mapping time to space, prevents it, and only allows a space-to-time mapping that opposes current and remote (past and future) time’.

#### The appropriation of the cartographic term “mapping” blocks effective solvency

Rossetto 14, Universita` degli Studi di Padova, Italy. (Tania, Theorizing maps with literature, Progress in Human Geography 2014, Vol. 38(4) 513–530, KU Libraries)

What does ‘literary cartography’ mean exactly? To avoid vagueness and shape the field of literary cartography, scholars with geographical or literary backgrounds have attempted to draw overviews of the multiple relations between cartography and literature. In their seminal article (on which I will focus in the final part of this article), Muehrcke and Muehrcke (1974) offered an articulated exploration of ‘maps in literature’. Papotti (2000) researches the ‘liaison dangereuse’ between maps and literature, providing a framework that includes: methodological issues (the graphic map located within the text, the verbal description of maps, the verbal description of space aimed at replacing a concrete map); thematic issues (the evocative functions of maps in connection with peculiar thematic contexts such as war or education); ontological issues (the literary treatment of the truthfulness and falseness of maps); linguistic issues (the creative and metaphoric appropriation of cartographic words). Ryan (2003a) provides a taxonomy of what she calls ‘narrative cartography’. Based on the usage of the word ‘map’ in cognitive science, the taxonomy includes the following categories: maps of ‘real-world’ geographical contexts (spaces of literature production or locations of plots) drawn by literary scholars; maps of the topographic organization of the (real or fictional) ‘textual world’ designed by authors, commissioned to illustrators, added by editors, spontaneously drawn by readers or produced by critics; maps of the (abstract, virtual) ‘textual space’, or database maps, typically made available to readers of hypertexts; maps of the ‘spatial form of the text’ (metaphorical space constituted by the network of internal correspondences), such as the arrangement of themes or characters’ relations in geometrical diagrams drawn by literary scholars; plotmaps, i.e. graphic representations of narrative action in the time-space continuum produced by narratological cartographers; the text itself that looks like a map (see also Haft, 2000). The claim for a more articulated ‘critical literary cartography’ is at the centre of a recent intervention by Cooper (2012). The author follows Cuddy-Keane (2002) and Thacker (2005/ 2006) in critiquing the process of proliferating the metaphorization occurring with the term ‘mapping’ in literary criticism. The metaphorical drift fails to transform cartographic terms into effective hermeneutic instruments, producing a ‘decartographization’ of the field. To enhance the impact of cartography on criticism (‘recartographization’), Cooper (2012) proposes developing reader-generated mapping, i.e. (digital) ‘critical maps’ made by literary critics upon analyses of texts (p. 31), on the one hand, and a focus on authorial actual maps included in literary texts, which are to be accurately emplaced by geocritics within their historical, material, social and cultural context following the ‘work of J.B. Harley, Denis Wood and other key critical cartographers’ (pp. 30–31), on the other. The ‘critical’ within the study of the authorial maps is substantial in the application of a critical Harleian reading of those cartographic artifacts (‘critical cartography’ in its proper sense), while the ‘critical’ within the digitalized reader-generated cartography seems to consist of the replacement of a purely metaphorical use of cartographic concepts with a more effective map-making (the use of cartographic tools to produce ‘literary criticism’).

#### The language of “mapping” used as part of their performance imports a cartographic world view that functions to legitimate the territorialization of space

Italiano 20, Austrian Academy of Sciences, (Fererico, Escaping the map: American science fiction and its cartographic imagination, European Journal of American Culture Date: March 1, 2020, KU Libraries)

CARTOGRAPHIC IMAGINATION Following Edward Said (2003) and Derek Gregory (1994), among others, I define geographical imagination as a performative negotiation between epistemological determinations of space and the way we invent and produce our own spatial perception (cf. Italiano 2016). Cartographic imagination, as I see it, is similarly a negotiation between epistemological spatial constructions, cultural spatial practices and subjective worldviews. However, its specific nature depends on the media and cultural practice of cartographic production, that is, in the first place, maps – but also globes, measuring instruments, logbooks, landscape paintings, aerial and drone photography, satellite images and so on. Drawing on Robert Stockhammer (2007), Smith (2008) and Jörg Dünne (2011), among others, I argue that the minimal condition for the emergence of a cartographic imagination is the reference to the concrete, form-shaping media practice of the map understood in its broadest sense. In this way, cartographic imagination in literary texts or films is the aesthetic organization of diegetic and extradiegetic space by means of cartographic intertextualities, para-textualities and performances. But what is this object we broadly call map? A map, as a composite system of indexes, does not send its reader to a specific place, but stores the knowledge with which this place can exist.1 In this sense, Harley and Woodward’s broad and already classic definition of the map still seems practicable. In their preface to his History of Cartography, they define maps as ‘graphic representations that facilitate a spatial understanding of things, concepts, conditions, processes, or events in the human world’ (Harley and Woodward 1987: xvi). Similarly, Denis Cosgrove defines the map as a graphic register of correspondence between two spaces, whose explicit result is a ‘space of representation’ (Cosgrove 1999: 1). In the definitions of Harley and Cosgrove, cartographic production is no longer seen in a positivist sense as the objective reproduction of an earthly reality, but as part of discourse, whose implications are of a political, social, rhetorical and metaphorical nature. However, this definition of the map hides the danger of considering cartography as a mere representation and pure construction, thus eliminating the pressing question of the territory. Maps do not only represent the world, they manipulate it, recreate it, distort it, and reimagine it. As spatial control devices, maps act as instruments of territorialization and space organization. Already in the early 1940s, the Polish-American semanticist Alfred Korzybski (whose General Semantics, by the way, deeply influenced many science fiction writers, such as Robert A. Heinlein, A. E. van Vogt and Frank Herbert among the others) affirmed that the map is not the territory (Korzybski 1990: 205), but rather that which produces it, outlining the nucleus of the post-structuralist critical cartography, well summarized by this passage by John Pickles: Cartographic institutions and practices have coded, decoded and recoded planetary, national and social spaces. […]. They have respaced the geo-body. Maps and mappings precede the territory they ‘represent’. […] [T]erritories are produced by the overlaying of inscriptions we call mappings. (Pickles 2004: 5) A map is therefore, on one hand, an indexical device capable of organizing, territorializing and economizing space. In contrast, however, it develops such a semiotic complexity that it cannot be reduced to the mere instrumentality of a given territorial reference. This semiotic surplus of the map, this surplus of meaning, is what acts on our imagination, becoming a sort of ‘imagination matrix’, capable of generating further media operations, in particular writing processes (Dünne 2011: 44). Maps can therefore perform two apparently opposite actions: on the one hand, they set boundaries, govern spaces, organize territories; in contrast, they create images, visions and ideas. With their semiotic surplus, they generate narratives, which, in turn, challenge existing territorial power orders. In this sense, it is legitimate to speak of a cartographic imagination, because a map can generate, with its semiotic surplus, new narratives and new worlds of meaning.